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Abstract 
This thesis includes three essays in mutual funds, empirical finance, and asset pricing. 
            The first essay explores the relation between mutual fund ownership and how it 
affects firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagements. The essay classifies 
mutual funds into CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly funds using a holdings-based, value-
weighted mutual fund corporate social rating (MFCSR). The empirical results show that 
firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are associated with increased future levels of 
CSR and the firms with higher CSR-unfriendly ownership are associated with decreased 
future levels of CSR. This result is robust after controlling for many observable firm 
characteristics and firm-specific unobservable characteristics and suggests that mutual 
fund shareholders’ CSR beliefs are important determinants of a firm’s social 
performance. 
            The second essay examines whether credit markets react to linguistic tone of 
accounting disclosures. The essay uses event study analyses and finds that high levels of 
uncertain tone in the 10-Q/K filings lead to a significant increase in credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads around the disclosure date. This finding is consistent with uncertainty in 
language, increasing perceived default risk. The magnitude of this effect monotonically 
decreases with maturity of CDS contracts. Moreover, this effect is robust to earnings 
surprises, management guidance, special firm-specific events, and alternative proxies of 
uncertainty. Overall, the results imply that the tone of accounting disclosures provides 
valuable, incremental information to the CDS markets. 
            The third essay studies whether the type of organizational structure in mutual 
funds affects the likelihood of window dressing. Using U.S. equity mutual fund data, I 
find that, conditional on inferior performance, team-managed funds have lower levels of 
window dressing and deceive significantly less than single-managed funds. The negative 
relation between team-managed funds and window dressing is not driven by various fund 
characteristics that differ between single- and team-managed funds. This relation is 
especially significant when other forms of fund governance mechanisms are low. Thus, 
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the findings support the notion that the team form of organization helps reduce the 
incentive to deceive. 
Keywords 
Mutual Funds; Corporate Social Responsibility; Window Dressing; Organizational 
Structure; Deception; Textual Analysis; Default Risk; Uncertainty, Tone; Accounting 
Disclosure 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
            The thesis includes three essays (Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4) in various 
areas in empirical finance covering mutual funds, corporate social responsibility, and the 
impact of uncertainty in financial statements. 
            The first essay explores the impact of mutual fund ownership on the corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) commitments of their holding firms. The literature on the role 
of CSR falls either into the value maximization view (e.g., Besley and Ghatak, 2007; 
Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013) or into the agency problem view (Jensen, 
2001; Masulis and Reza, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). Therefore, a CSR-friendly 
shareholder (one who believes in the value maximization view) would support increasing 
CSR spending and a CSR-unfriendly investor (one who believes in the agency view) 
would support decreasing CSR spending. The essay specifically investigates whether 
increases in CSR-friendly ownership result in increases in the CSR commitments of a 
firm, and subsequently, if CSR-unfriendly ownership results in decreases in the CSR 
commitments of a firm. 
            I calculate a holdings-based, value-weighted CSR score for every mutual fund in 
a year and identify them as CSR-friendly (CSR-unfriendly) if it belongs to the top 
(bottom) tercile for three consecutive years. Subsequently, I calculate the total amount of 
CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year. I find that increases 
in CSR-friendly ownership in a firm are positively associated with future increases in the 
CSR of the firm. Likewise, I also find that increases in CSR-unfriendly ownership are 
negatively associated with future changes in the CSR of the firm. Furthermore, I find that 
the influence of CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly ownership depends on the firm’s 
current level of CSR. When a firm’s CSR commitments are below average, CSR-friendly 
ownership has a larger positive impact on CSR and CSR-unfriendly investors have a 
smaller negative impact on the CSR of the firm. This pattern holds when examining their 
impact on the CSR strengths and CSR weaknesses of a firm separately. CSR-friendly 
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ownership increases the CSR strengths and reduces the CSR weaknesses of a firm. CSR-
unfriendly ownership reduces the CSR strengths of a firm, but also reduces the CSR 
weaknesses of a firm, albeit not statistically significant at conventional levels. This shows 
that even CSR-unfriendly investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose 
implementing some CSR reforms. 
            Chapter 3 examines the role of linguistic tone of accounting disclosures in the 
pricing of Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts. In credit markets, researchers use a 
variety of accounting variables such as financial ratios, earnings, management forecasts, 
and analyst reports to price credit securities such as CDS. Little attention is given to the 
impact of qualitative or “soft” information, such as linguistic tone, in these accounting 
disclosures on CDS spreads. The essay investigates whether 10-Q/K filings with higher 
proportions of uncertain words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible) affect 
investors’ beliefs about the firm’s default risk as captured by CDS spreads. The uncertain 
word list from the dictionaries developed by Loughran and McDonald, (2011) is used to 
measure disclosure tone. We argue that the tone of 10-Q/K filings reflects the 
management’s confidence in the firm’s business strategy, competitive position within the 
industry, and future financial wellbeing. Any uncertainty expressed through the tone of 
these disclosures should influence investors’ evaluations of the firm’s future value. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher the usage of uncertain words in these 
disclosures, the greater the uncertainty in investors’ beliefs about the firm’s value and 
thus, the higher the CDS spreads. We also investigate the impact of uncertain disclosure 
tone on the term structure of CDS spreads across maturities. Duffie and Lando, (2001) 
predict that firms with “noisy” accounting reports have significantly higher credit spreads 
at shorter maturities compared to longer maturities. Therefore, we postulate that the effect 
of disclosure uncertainty varies across the term structure of credit spreads, with relatively 
higher impact for shorter maturities. 
            The empirical results in Chapter 3 show a positive relation between uncertain 
disclosure tone and changes in CDS spreads. Firms with greater uncertainty in the tone of 
10-Q/K disclosure experience a significant increase in their CDS spreads following the 
public disclosure. We find that one standard deviation increase in uncertain tone 
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increases the CDS spreads by 1.4 basis points (bps) relative to the mean change across all 
firms of around 0.47 bps. Our finding is robust to controlling for equity returns, market 
volatility, spot rate, aggregate default, and term premium. Consistent with Duffie and 
Lando, (2001), we also find that CDS spreads with short-term maturities have greater 
sensitivity to uncertain tone than long-term maturities. In fact, uncertain tone sensitivities 
decline monotonically with maturity. This finding suggests that disclosure tone contains 
useful default risk information for investors in valuation of CDS contracts, particularly 
with short-term maturity. 
            In Chapter 4, I study the effect of organizational structure of mutual funds on an 
important agency problem in mutual funds— “window dressing.” Window dressing is a 
form of portfolio manipulation where some managers sell poorly performing stocks and 
buy stocks that performed well over the reporting period to hide their true managerial 
ability from investors (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 1991; Agarwal, Gay, 
and Ling, 2014; Meier and Schaumburg, 2004). This practice is looked upon 
unfavourably as it affects portfolio value through unnecessary trading costs and 
potentially priming the portfolio for lower future returns. Prior research shows that team-
managed organizations can lower the inclination to engage in deceptive behaviour 
(Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and teams increase the cost of 
deception by greater peer monitoring, higher guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 
2006), and by dividing the output among several members (Acemoglu, Kremer, and 
Mian, 2008). In this essay, I particularly look at whether team-managed funds (mutual 
funds with two or more fund managers) window dress less than single-managed funds 
(mutual funds with only one fund manager) when they have inferior performance. 
            The results of Chapter 4 show that, conditional on inferior performance, team-
managed funds window dress less by almost 20 basis points per quarter when compared 
to single-managed funds. These differences are highly significant. I also investigate the 
circumstances under which team-managed funds are effective in curtailing deceptive 
behaviour. Larger fund families tend to have more resources and better internal 
governance mechanisms (Khoranna, 1996). Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) also show that 
the career concerns and incentives differ vastly among more experienced, older managers 
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vs younger managers and that more experienced managers are more likely to engage in 
deceptive behaviour. Thus, I postulate that team-managed funds will have a greater 
impact in reducing window dressing among smaller fund families and also among older, 
more experienced managers. I find exactly this result, as team-managed funds do not 
differ from single-managed funds in the levels of window dressing among large fund 
families. However, among smaller fund families where internal governance mechanisms 
are weaker, team-managed funds window dress less when compared to single-managed 
funds. I also find that team-managed funds window dress considerably less than their 
single-managed counterparts among older, more experienced managers. Overall, the 
findings from this chapter show different situations where managerial structure is very 
effective in curtailing window dressing behaviour in the mutual fund industry. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Do Mutual Funds Affect Corporate Social 
Responsibility? 
2.1 Introduction 
            Investment funds incorporating social criteria have enjoyed tremendous growth 
over the past two decades. The U.S. Social Investment Forum (USSIF) reports that assets 
managed using environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues totalled $6.57 trillion 
at the start of 2014. Investment companies respond to this demand by pivoting some of 
their existing funds to incorporate ESG criteria and by introducing new mutual funds 
with ESG criteria. Despite such growth in socially responsible investments, it is unclear 
to what extent these funds, along with other shareholders, have the capability or interest 
to influence the corporate social responsibility (CSR) commitments of their holding firms 
and this essay investigates exactly that.1 
            The literature on the role of CSR in corporations can be broadly classified into 
two views. The first view argues that CSR is in line with value maximization (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2007; Edmans, 2011; Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013). The second view is that CSR 
is a manifestation of agency problems inside a firm and benefits the managers at the 
expense of the shareholders (Masulis and Reza, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). 
Additionally, managers who are engaged in CSR can lose focus on their primary 
responsibility of operating the firm (Jensen, 2001). So, according to the agency view, 
firms should not engage in CSR, as it is not in the interest of shareholders. The views of 
institutional owners and shareholders on the role of CSR can fall into either the value 
maximization view (CSR-friendly) or the agency cost view (CSR-unfriendly). Therefore, 
a CSR-friendly shareholder would support increasing CSR spending and a CSR-
unfriendly shareholder would support decreasing CSR spending. This essay specifically 
                                                 
1
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in this paper refers to the Environmental and Social issues and does 
not include the traditional Governance issues. 
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investigates whether increases in CSR-friendly ownership result in increases in the CSR 
commitments of a firm, and subsequently, if CSR-unfriendly ownership results in 
decreases in the CSR commitments of a firm. 
            The research questions above are examined using a sample of actively managed 
U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. I focus on actively managed mutual funds, as they 
can be classified as CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly by observing their detailed 
holdings data. Active mutual funds do not have to keep holding on to a stock if it has a 
very high or low CSR. They can add or drop a stock from their portfolio at any point in 
time. Even though passive indexed funds can influence CSR, they cannot add or drop a 
stock from their portfolio as they please. This makes it difficult to infer from their 
holdings if they are CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly. The mutual fund holding data from 
Morningstar are combined with firm-level CSR data from the MSCI ESG KLD database 
from WRDS. This enables me to calculate a Mutual Fund CSR score (MFCSR), which is 
the value-weighted average of the CSR ratings (total CSR strengths less total CSR 
concerns) of all the stocks held by the mutual fund at the end of the year.2 Using a 
holdings-based measure allows for the inclusion of all mutual funds instead of focusing 
only on a small sample of self-declared socially responsible funds (SRI). Using this 
measure, I identify a mutual fund as CSR-friendly (CSR-unfriendly) if it belongs to the 
top (bottom) tercile for three consecutive years.3 Subsequently, I calculate the total 
amount of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year. 
            Using a sample of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations, I find 
that increases in CSR-friendly ownership in a firm are positively associated with future 
increases in the CSR commitments of the firm. Likewise, I find that increases in CSR-
unfriendly ownership are negatively associated with future changes in the CSR of the 
firm. I also find that the influence of CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly ownership depends 
                                                 
2
 Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst, (2015) and El Ghoul and Karoui, (2017) use similar measures.  
3
 Classifying CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly funds based on top and bottom quintiles do not 
qualitatively change the results. 
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on the firm’s current level of CSR. When a firm’s CSR commitments are below average, 
CSR-friendly ownership has a larger positive impact and CSR-unfriendly investors have 
a smaller negative impact on the CSR of the firm. Furthermore, I find that CSR-friendly 
ownership increases the CSR strengths and reduces the CSR weaknesses of a firm. CSR-
unfriendly ownership reduces the CSR strengths of a firm, but also reduces the CSR 
weaknesses of a firm, albeit not statistically significant at conventional levels. This shows 
that even CSR-unfriendly investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose 
implementing some CSR reforms. 
           I also show a direct mechanism through which CSR-friendly ownership and CSR- 
unfriendly ownership can affect the CSR of a firm. Previous research shows that under 
certain circumstances, CSR-contingent compensation to executives can constitute optimal 
contracting (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan, 
1997). I find that firms with higher CSR-friendly (unfriendly) ownership are positively 
(negatively) associated with having executive compensation linked to CSR-related 
outcomes. Other alternative explanations, such as corporate governance and managerial 
incentives that may explain the results, are also ruled out. Jo and Harjoto, (2012) show 
that corporate governance is positively associated with the CSR of a firm. I add two 
governance variables to the regression: board size and percentage of independent 
directors, which reflect the effectiveness of board governance. I find that CSR-friendly 
and CSR-unfriendly ownership still have an influence on CSR beyond that explained by 
changes in governance. Prior studies also examine the relationship between executive 
compensation incentives and CSR, but the results are inconclusive (Mahoney and 
Thorne, 2005; Berrone, Makri, and Gomez-Mejia, 2008). I add two variables related to 
executive compensation: the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in stock price 
(CEO delta) and the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in stock return volatility 
(CEO vega). However, the effect of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership on the 
future CSR of the firm remains the same. 
            The essay contributes to the growing literature on the role of investors on the 
corporate social responsibility of a firm. Dimson, Karakaş, and Li, (2015) use private 
institutional data and show how private engagements can be used to improve CSR. Dyck, 
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Lins, Roth, and Wagner, (2016) use international data and show that institutional 
ownership originating from countries with higher social norms are positively associated 
with a firm’s CSR performance. In this essay, I make four important contributions: This 
is one of the first essays to classify mutual fund shareholder ownership in a firm as CSR-
friendly and CSR-unfriendly. Second, I show that the changes in CSR-friendly and CSR-
unfriendly ownership are important determinants of a firm’s CSR and that responsible 
funds influence them in a positive way. Third, I show that CSR-friendly and CSR-
unfriendly ownership affect the likelihood of executives’ compensations being contracted 
on CSR. Finally, I show that the support and opposition to CSR from the shareholders are 
very dependent on the firm’s current level of CSR and are very different for CSR 
strengths and CSR weaknesses. 
            The remainder of the essay is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an 
overview of the related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe the sample and the 
variables used in all the tests. Section 2.4 presents the results of the regressions between 
CSR-friendly mutual fund ownership and a firm’s CSR commitments, and Section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility, Responsible Investing, and 
Firm Value 
            A large number of literature explores the link between responsible investing and 
fund performance. While some studies show a positive relationship (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2006), and others show a negative relationship (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Borgers, Derwall, Koedijk, and Horst, 2015), the majority of studies finds no significant 
differences between responsible funds and conventional funds (Renneboog, Ter Horst, 
and Zhang, 2008). On the link between CSR and firm value, Bénabou and Tirole, (2010) 
summarize the literature and offer two views. The first view argues that CSR is in line 
with value maximization as it enables the management to take a long-term perspective 
(Edmans, 2011). This view also states that by implementing CSR, firms can increase 
product differentiation, build reputation, increase customer loyalty, and premium pricing 
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(Besley and Ghatak, 2007; Brekke and Nyborg, 2008). The second view is that CSR is a 
manifestation of agency problems inside a firm and is value-destroying (Masulis and 
Reza, 2015); Freidman, 1970).4 
2.2.2 Institutional Ownership and Corporate Social Responsibility 
            The effect of institutional ownership on corporate governance is well-
documented. Higher institutional ownership is positively associated with better 
governance. Examples from the literature include Agrawal and Mandelker, (1992); Del 
Guercio and Hawkins, (1999); Gillan and Starks, (2000); and Hartzell and Starks, (2003). 
This monitoring effect is achieved by two methods: voicing opinions and the threat of 
exit. In the first method, the investor chooses to engage with the firm by having meetings, 
discussions, and phone calls with the firm’s executives (Goldstein, 2011, 2014) or by 
introducing shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks, 2000). Dissatisfied shareholders 
can also use the exit option and express their opinions by selling company shares. For 
example, Parrino, Sias, and Starks, (2003) show that large sell-offs by institutional 
investors increase the probability of the CEO being replaced. The influence of the 
institutional investors on environmental and social issues also happens in similar ways to 
corporate governance; however, there is limited research in this area. Dimson, Karakaş, 
and Li, (2015) use data from a large, institutional investor and examine engagements 
related to CSR issues. They find that CSR activism increases shareholder value when the 
engagements are successful and does not decrease shareholder value when unsuccessful. 
Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner, (2016) use international data and show that institutional 
ownership originating from countries with higher social norms are positively associated 
with a firm’s CSR performance. 
                                                 
4
 Bénabou and Tirole, (2010) also specify a third view where firms use CSR as an efficient channel to 
express their values on behalf of the stakeholders. This view can be argued to be in line with value 
maximization as it can result in higher motivation among employees, lower turnover, and higher reputation. 
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2.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
            This essay contributes to the existing literature by using a panel data of firms and 
examining the impact of certain types of institutional ownership on the CSR performance 
of their holding firms. Instead of looking at the overall level of institutional ownership or 
mutual fund ownership, I look at both the levels and changes in CSR-friendly and CSR-
unfriendly mutual fund ownership in a firm. At first glance, it seems obvious that CSR-
friendly ownership will positively influence the holdings of their firms, but this need not 
be the case. Literature shows that socially conscious investors have longer investment 
horizons and are willing to accept lower financial performance (Riedl and Smeets, 2017); 
and that fund outflows in socially responsible funds are less sensitive to performance 
compared to conventional funds (Benson, Brailsford, and Humphrey, 2006; Renneboog, 
Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2011). Also, as consumers and investors become more socially 
responsible, investment firms introduce new fund types to generate subsequent capital 
inflows and incremental revenue. In short, investment firms can use CSR as an 
advertising tool to attract socially conscious investors. This leads to the first two 
hypotheses. 
H1a: CSR-friendly ownership has a positive influence on a firm’s future CSR. 
H1b: CSR-unfriendly ownership has a negative influence on a firm’s future CSR. 
            The influence of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership on firms also 
depends on the firm’s current level of CSR. If a firm has poor CSR compared to its peers, 
then it can lead to higher turnover, lower customer satisfaction, and can face a loss of 
reputation (Kotchen and Moon, 2012). In these scenarios, the firm is more likely to face 
pressure from CSR-friendly shareholders to increase CSR. CSR-unfriendly shareholders 
are also less likely to oppose CSR spending, as the benefits of CSR spending are more 
visible and CSR projects are more likely to have positive net present value. Whereas, if a 
firm already has good CSR, then CSR-unfriendly shareholders are more likely to oppose 
CSR spending, as the benefits of CSR are less visible. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) 
show that companies with better stakeholder relations also have higher selling, general, 
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and administrative expenses and that firms do not recover these expenditures through 
increases in sales. Krüger, (2015) finds that investors react negatively to the arrival of 
negative CSR news, and slightly negatively to the release of positive CSR news. This 
shows that there are significant costs associated with social irresponsibility, but 
unconditionally, investors do not appreciate the implementation of CSR policies. This 
leads to the next two hypotheses. 
H2a: The positive effect of CSR-friendly mutual funds is higher in firms with poor CSR. 
H2b: The negative effect of CSR-unfriendly mutual funds is higher in firms with good 
CSR. 
2.3 Data, Summary Statistics, and Methodology 
2.3.1 Measure of CSR, MFCSR, and Other Variables 
            The CSR rating of a firm is obtained from the MSCI ESG KLD STATS database 
(henceforth KLD). KLD’s database includes more than 650 companies from 1991 and 
more than 3,000 companies comprised of the Russell 3000 index since 2003. Analysts 
from KLD use publicly available information, company filings, government data, non-
governmental organization data, and media sources and single out relevant information to 
measure a firm’s environmental, social, and governance performance (ESG). Each firm is 
evaluated on a set of strengths and weaknesses in each of the following dimensions: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product 
safety.5 If a firm performs a good (bad) deed deemed by KLD, it gains one point in 
strengths (weaknesses). I calculate the overall CSR rating for a firm as the sum of the 
total number of strengths less the total number of concerns across all categories.6 
                                                 
5
 KLD also evaluates a firm on corporate governance. As the focus of this paper is strictly on the role of 
mutual fund on CSR, I exclude the corporate governance measure when calculating the CSR score. 
6
 The simple KLD score can have a drawback as it is not possible to compare scores across time as the 
number of strengths and concerns vary considerably every year. All our regressions use time fixed effects 
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            The data on mutual funds come from Morningstar Direct and cover all actively 
managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1996 to 2012. The sample used 
includes funds that belong to the following investment objectives: aggressive growth, 
growth, growth and income, and equity income. The sample excludes sector, 
international, balanced, and index funds from the analysis. The data on firm-specific 
variables such as firm size, return on assets (ROA), leverage, market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
research and development (R&D) spending, and advertising expenses are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. These control variables have been shown to be important determinants of 
corporate social performance (Hong, Li, and Minor, 2016; Yermack, 2009). For example, 
larger firms are expected to engage in more CSR spending and return on assets is also 
very likely correlated with CSR spending, as less profitable firms are less likely to 
engage in CSR (Masulis and Reza, 2015). Similarly, CSR can be viewed as a form of 
advertising and controlling for it is important (Campbell, 2007). Appendix 2-1 lists the 
definitions and measurement of all variables. 
2.3.2 CSR-Friendly Ownership and CSR-Unfriendly Ownership 
            I identify a mutual fund as CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly based on its mutual 
fund level CSR score (MFCSR). To construct a mutual fund level CSR score, I first 
match the annual data from Morningstar Direct to the CSR scores of firms from KLD. 
Some stocks are not assigned a rating by KLD. To address this problem, I follow 
Cremers and Petajisto, (2009) and El Ghoul and Karoui, (2017) and require that the sum 
of the equity weights with a CSR rating accounts for at least 67% of the portfolio. For a 
more complete and reliable dataset, I exclude a fund if it holds less than 10 firms in its 
portfolio and has total net assets of less than $5 million (Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 
2008). The MFCSR score is calculated as the value-weighted average of the CSR ratings 
of all the stocks held by the mutual fund at the end of the year. I then sort all mutual 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
to address this problem. I also use adjusted CSR scores similar to Deng, Kang and Low (2013) and find 
similar results. 
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funds each year according to its MFCSR score every year and classify them as CSR-
friendly if they belong to the top tercile for three consecutive years.7 Similarly, a mutual 
fund is classified as CSR-unfriendly if it belongs to the bottom tercile for three 
consecutive years.8 Finally, each year, I compute the total percentage of CSR-friendly 
and CSR-unfriendly mutual fund ownership in a firm. 
            The final combined sample consists of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year 
observations from 1996 to 2012. The book leverage of a firm is capped between 0 and 1. 
To remove the effect of extremely small firms, I remove a firm from the sample if it has a 
market capitalization of less than $5 million USD. I also winsorize all variables at 1% 
and 99% levels to reduce the effect of outliers. Table 2-1 presents the Fama-French 48 
industry and year distributions for the whole sample. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
            Panel A of Table 2-2 presents the summary statistics of all the firm-year 
observations in the sample. The average firm in a year has a CSR rating of less than zero. 
This shows that the average firm has more concerns than strengths across its six CSR 
categories. The total mutual fund ownership in a firm is 10.95%, which is sub-classified 
into CSR-friendly ownership of 0.77% and CSR-unfriendly ownership of 4.89%. The rest 
of the mutual fund ownership is unclassified. Ownership by self-declared SRI funds 
amounts to a very small 0.18%. The rest of the variables are firm controls and the average 
value of: return on assets is 2.0%; log(Sales) is 6.914; book leverage is .222; market-to-
book ratio is 1.51; research and development expenses are 4% of total assets; and 
advertising expenses are 1.2% of total assets. 
                                                 
7
 As a robustness measure, I also sort funds each year within its style (objective) category to avoid potential 
correlations between fund style and MFCSR. 
8
 Many funds happen to have a high MFCSR score in one year and normal or low MFCSR score in another 
year. I look at three years of information to avoid misclassifying such funds.  
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2.4.2 Correlations and Cross-sectional Regressions 
            Panel B of Table 2-2 presents the correlation table. As hypothesized, the total 
mutual fund ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership are negatively related to the CSR 
ratings of a firm, but the CSR-friendly ownership is positively related to the CSR ratings 
of a firm. The sign of correlation for the rest of the control variables is as expected: ROA, 
size, M/B ratio, R&D, and advertising are all positively correlated with CSR and leverage 
is negatively correlated with CSR. However, correlations do not control for firm-specific 
characteristics and therefore, I conduct numerous multivariate analyses in the next 
sections. Table 2-3 shows the results of a population averaged cross-sectional regression. 
After controlling for firm-specific characteristics, firms with higher CSR ratings are 
positively associated with CSR-friendly ownership and firms with lower CSR ratings are 
positively associated with CSR-unfriendly ownership. Total mutual fund ownership is 
negatively associated with the CSR rating of a firm. 
2.4.3 Fixed Effect Regressions and Change Regressions 
            The previous cross-sectional regression results do not tell us if CSR-friendly or 
CSR-unfriendly ownership has any influence on its holding firms. I run the following 
panel data fixed effect regression: 
𝑪𝑺𝑹𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒕𝒚𝒑𝒆𝒕 + 𝜼𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜹𝒊 +  𝜸𝒕 +  𝝐𝒊𝒕  (𝟐. 𝟏) 
where the dependent variable is the CSR rating in the following year and the variable of 
interest is the type of ownership, which can be either overall mutual fund ownership, 
CSR-friendly ownership, or CSR-unfriendly ownership depending on the specification. 
The firm fixed effect is 𝛿𝑖  and the year fixed effect 𝛾𝑡 is added to ensure that the 
estimates are not driven by an upward trend in the increase of CSR across all firms. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
            Table 2-4 shows the results of the fixed effects regression. CSR-friendly 
ownership is positively and significantly related to a firm’s future CSR and CSR-
unfriendly ownership is negatively and significantly related to a firm’s future CSR. The 
results also show how the heterogeneity of “CSR friendliness” among mutual funds 
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affects its holding firms’ CSR. Even though the coefficients from the fixed effects 
regression are very significant, the CSR ratings of firms could potentially be serially 
correlated over time and reverse causality cannot be ruled out. I conduct first difference 
(change) regressions to check how changes in CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly 
ownership lead to changes in CSR ratings in the following year. Apart from running the 
regression for the full sample, I also split the data into two subsamples: one where the 
CSR rating of the firm is below the median and one where the CSR rating of the firm is 
above the median. The regression specification is as below. 
𝛥𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛥𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑡  + 𝜂𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡  (2.2) 
where the variables are the same as in equation 2.1 except that both the left-hand side and 
the right-hand side variables reflect the change from the previous year. In this equation, 
𝛿𝑖 represents the industry fixed effect. Table 2-5 shows the results of the above regression 
specification. In all the regressions, the change in CSR-friendly ownership has a positive 
and significant relation with the change in a firm’s future CSR, and the change in CSR-
unfriendly ownership has a negative and significant relation with the change in a firm’s 
future CSR. As expected in hypotheses 2, the coefficient on the change in CSR-friendly 
ownership is larger when the firm’s CSR is poor (below median). Similarly, the 
coefficient on the change in CSR-unfriendly ownership is larger when the firm’s CSR is 
good (above median). These results show that the influence of CSR-friendly ownership is 
stronger when the firm has poor CSR. Even shareholders who do not have favourable 
opinions of CSR do not oppose CSR very strongly when the firm’s CSR is poor relative 
to when the firm’s CSR is good. 
2.4.4 Likelihood of Firm Offering CSR-Linked Compensation 
One channel through which shareholder ownership can influence the CSR of a 
firm is by linking executive compensation to CSR improvements. Academic research 
shows that under certain circumstances, CSR-contingent compensation to executives can 
constitute optimal contracting (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Ittner, 
Larcker, and Rajan, 1997). However, critics of CSR contracts argue that they could create 
perverse incentives and that CSR benchmarks are easy to manipulate and difficult to 
verify. So, I postulate that firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are more likely to 
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have executives with CSR-contingent compensation and that firms with higher CSR-
unfriendly ownership are less likely to have executives with CSR-contingent 
compensation. 
            I identify the S&P 500 companies from 2009–2013 and examine their proxy 
statements for each year. In going through these statements, I note whether executives 
were offered any compensation contingent on measures such as “safety,” “pollution,” 
“customer satisfaction,” “social responsibility,” etc. Specifically, to code the 
compensation as CSR-linked, I use a collection of keywords based on guidance from a 
sustainability consulting firm.9 I differentiate between firms that grant a CSR-contingent 
compensation contract and those that do not by using a dummy variable CSR Contract 
Dummy, which takes a value of 1 if the firm’s proxy statement indicates that one or more 
of its executive’s pay is tied to achievement of CSR-related outcomes, 0 otherwise. 
Table 2-6 presents the results of a population averaged-logistic regression. The 
overall level of mutual fund ownership is negatively related and almost statistically 
significant at the 10% level, to the likelihood of firms offering CSR-linked compensation. 
The level of CSR-unfriendly ownership negatively relates to the likelihood of CSR-
linked compensation and the coefficient is statistically very significant. Ikram, Li, and 
Minor, (2018) also show that socially responsible firms are more likely to have CSR-
linked compensation contracts. To capture this effect, I run a regression where I interact 
CSR-friendly ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership with the current level of CSR 
rating. The interaction term of CSR F-own X CSR Rating is not significant, but the 
interaction term of CSR UF-own X CSR Rating is negative and significant. This shows 
that when CSR-unfriendly ownership is high, and the current CSR level of a firm is high, 
the firm is very unlikely to have executive compensation linked to CSR. CSR-friendly 
ownership, however, is not significantly associated with CSR Contract Dummy in any of 
the regression specifications. 
                                                 
9
 The complete collection of keywords is listed in Appendix 2-2. 
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2.4.5 CSR Strengths and Weaknesses 
            In many cases, CSR-related expenditure can be interpreted to mitigate the 
problems and negative publicity associated with social costs. If the social costs are large, 
it can be advantageous for companies to anticipate social pressure and reduce conflict by 
investing in CSR-related activities (Heal, 2005). Many papers have shown that firms 
invest in CSR-related activities to mitigate harm from certain other CSR weaknesses 
(Kotchen and Moon, 2012; Mueller and Kraussl, 2011). For the above reasons, I test if 
CSR-friendly ownership and CSR-unfriendly ownership differ in their impact on CSR 
strengths and CSR weaknesses separately instead of combining them into a single index. 
Table 2-7 presents the results of the regression. For CSR strengths, the results are 
qualitatively similar to Table 2-5. Total mutual fund ownership and CSR-unfriendly 
ownership are negatively related to future CSR strengths and CSR-friendly ownership is 
positively related to future CSR strengths. However, both CSR-friendly ownership and 
CSR-unfriendly ownership reduce the future CSR weaknesses of a firm. Although not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, this shows that even CSR-unfriendly 
investors recognize some benefits of CSR and do not oppose implementing some CSR 
reforms. 
2.4.6 Corporate Governance and Executive Incentives 
             Hong, Li, and Minor, (2016) and Jo and Harjoto, (2012) show that corporate 
governance improvements have an influence on the CSR ratings of firms. I use two 
variables to proxy for improvements in corporate governance: change in board size and 
change in percentage of independent directors.10 The data for board size and board 
independence are obtained from COMPUSTAT. These variables are added to the same 
regression specification as equation 2.2. Table 2-8 presents the results of the regression 
with these additional controls. The coefficient on change in board size is not significant 
and the coefficients on change in percentage of independent directors is significant at the 
                                                 
10
 In unreported results, I also use changes in governance index (G-index) created by Gompers and Meshi 
(2006) from 2003–2006 and find qualitatively similar results. 
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10% level only in the full sample. The coefficients on CSR-friendly ownership and CSR-
unfriendly ownership are very similar to Table 2-5 and influence the future changes in the 
CSR of a firm even after controlling for corporate governance. 
            Another explanation for the changes in CSR could be due to changes in CEO 
incentives (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; (Coles and Li, 2012). I use two variables from the 
Execucomp database to control for CEO’s incentives: CEO delta (sensitivity of CEO’s 
wealth to changes in stock price) and CEO vega (sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes 
in stock return volatility). The changes in CEO delta and CEO vega are added as controls 
to equation 2.2. None of the coefficients are significantly related to the future change in 
CSR. 
2.5 Conclusion 
            Responsible investments have grown tremendously over the past decade and 
shareholders are increasingly paying attention to the CSR commitments of the firm. As 
different shareholders have different views on CSR, it is important to know the extent to 
which shareholders influence the CSR policies of a firm. 
            In this essay, I study a sample of all equity domestic U.S. mutual funds and 
employ a novel procedure of measuring CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly mutual fund 
ownership in a firm every year. I conduct a series of tests to see if they have any 
influence on the future CSR of a firm. The results also show that CSR-friendly and CSR-
unfriendly ownership are important determinants of a firm’s CSR. Further investigation 
has revealed that CSR-friendly ownership is associated with future increases in CSR 
strengths and future decreases in CSR weaknesses of a firm. Likewise, CSR-unfriendly 
ownership is associated with future decreases in CSR strengths, but has no effect on the 
future CSR weaknesses of a firm. The study also shows a direct channel through which 
mutual funds can affect the CSR of a firm. Firms with higher CSR-unfriendly ownership 
are less likely to have executive compensation contracts linked to social performance. 
Overall, the results show that the CSR policies of a firm are dependent on the 
composition of CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly shareholder ownership. 
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 Table 2-1: Sample Distribution by Industry and Year 
Panel A. Sample Distribution by Industry 
# FF48 Industry Description Number of Firms % 
1 Agriculture 59 0.27 
2 Aircraft 174 0.80 
3 Apparel 308 1.41 
4 Automobiles and Trucks 359 1.64 
5 Banking 479 2.19 
6 Beer and Liquor 75 0.34 
7 Business Services 2,597 11.89 
8 Business Supplies 338 1.55 
9 Candy and Soda 63 0.29 
10 Chemicals 612 2.80 
11 Coal 86 0.39 
12 Computers 869 3.98 
13 Construction 322 1.47 
14 Consumer Goods 399 1.83 
15 Construction Materials 413 1.89 
16 Defence 60 0.27 
17 Electrical Equipment 310 1.42 
18 Electronic Equipment 1,467 6.71 
19 Entertainment 316 1.45 
20 Fabricated Products 17 0.08 
21 Food Products 393 1.80 
22 Healthcare 380 1.74 
23 Insurance 305 1.40 
24 Machinery 936 4.28 
25 Measuring and Control Equipment 483 2.21 
26 Medical Equipment 643 2.94 
27 Mining 99 0.45 
28 Other 302 1.38 
29 Personal Services 308 1.41 
30 Petroleum and Natural Gas 1,017 4.65 
31 Pharmaceutical Products 1,347 6.17 
32 Precious Metals 59 0.27 
33 Printing and Publishing 217 0.99 
34 Real Estate 15 0.07 
35 Recreation 129 0.59 
36 Restaurants, Hotels and Motels 399 1.83 
37 Retail 1,469 6.72 
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38 Rubber and Plastic Products 108 0.49 
39 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 65 0.30 
40 Shipping Containers 93 0.43 
41 Steel Works 304 1.39 
42 Telecommunication 793 3.63 
43 Textiles 60 0.27 
44 Tobacco 50 0.23 
45 Trading 335 1.53 
46 Transportation 657 3.01 
47 Utilities 943 4.32 
48 Wholesale 617 2.82 
  Total 21,849 100 
Panel B. Sample Distribution by Year 
Year 
Number 
of Firms 
% 
1996   300 1.37 
1997 
 
334 1.53 
1998 
 
334 1.53 
1999 
 
375 1.72 
2000 
 
336 1.54 
2001 
 
707 3.24 
2002 
 
727 3.33 
2003 
 
1397 6.39 
2004 
 
2043 9.35 
2005 
 
1830 8.38 
2006 
 
1859 8.51 
2007 
 
1840 8.42 
2008 
 
1910 8.74 
2009 
 
1940 8.88 
2010 
 
2036 9.32 
2011 
 
1945 8.90 
2012  1936 8.86 
Total 21,849 100 
 
This table presents the Fama-French 48 industry and year distributions for the initial 
sample of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations. 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Panel A N Mean Median SD Min Max 
CSR Rating 21,849 -0.202 0.000 2.281 -9.000 18.000 
MF own (%) 21,849 10.948 9.749 8.309 0.042 35.548 
CSR F-own (%) 21,849 0.773 0.015 1.721 0.000 9.145 
CSR UF-own (%) 21,849 4.895 2.415 5.924 0.000 25.463 
SR own (%) 21,849 0.183 0.008 0.571 0.000 3.743 
ROA 21,849 0.020 0.043 0.143 -0.717 0.292 
Sales(Log) 21,849 6.914 6.894 1.811 0.000 13.055 
Book Leverage 21,849 0.222 0.194 0.206 0.000 0.929 
M/B Ratio 21,849 1.510 1.072 1.412 0.077 7.725 
R&D  21,849 0.040 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.454 
Advertising 21,849 0.012 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.191 
Panel sample consists of 3,803 unique firms and 21,849 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2012. Firm-
level data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This 
sample is matched with the MSCI ESG KLD stats database. CSR rating of a firm is defined as the #number 
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product. MF own is the total mutual fund ownership in a firm. CSR F-own 
is the mutual fund ownership held by CSR-friendly mutual funds. CSR UF-own is the mutual fund 
ownership held by CSR-unfriendly mutual funds. SR own is the mutual fund ownership held by self-
declared Socially Responsible Funds. ROA is Return on Assets. Size is the logarithm of the Sales. Book 
Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the market value of equity and is capped between 0 and 1. 
M/B is the market value of the firm scaled by total assets. R&D is the Research and Development expenses 
scaled by total assets. Advertising is the Advertising expenses scaled by total assets. A firm is removed 
from the sample if its market capitalization is less than $10 million.  
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Panel B: Correlation Table 
 
    
CSR MF own CSR F-own CSR UF-own SR own ROA Size Leverage M/B R&D 
  
  
   
     
CSR  1         
 MF own  -0.0243 1        
 CSR F-own 
 
0.2346 .2672 1       
 CSR UF-own 
 
-0.2088 0.6497 -.2556 1 
 
    
 SR own 
 
.1005 .0548 .2135 -.1491 1 
 
   
 ROA  0.0724 .1494 .0939 .0595 .0677 1 
 
  
 Size  0.1772 .0392 .3385 -.2629 .2785 .3268 1 
 
 
 Leverage  -0.0436 .1024 -.0316 -.1176 .0691 -.1239 .2254 1 
 
 M/B   0.0998 .0662 .1383 -.0735 -.0387 .0847 -.2830 -.3468 1 
 
R&D  0.0466 -.0644 .0458 -.0771 -.0732 -.4653 -.4263 -.2040 .3868 1 
Advertising   0.1067 0.0016 .0271 -0.0102 0.0107 .0815 .0698 -.0191 .1240 -.0746 
30 
 
 
Table 2-3: Cross-Sectional Regression of Mutual Fund Ownership on CSR 
Dependent Variable: CSR Scoret 
  1 2 3 4 
MF own -1.377*** 
   
 
(0.000) 
   
CSR F-own 
 
26.285*** 
 
24.768*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
CSR UF-own 
  
-3.794*** -3.318*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.025 -0.120 0.041 0.035 
 
(0.920) (0.626) (0.869) (0.889) 
Sales(Log) 0.377*** 0.283*** 0.346*** 0.264*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book Leverage -0.366** -0.281* -0.391*** -0.314** 
 
(0.015) (0.059) (0.009) (0.034) 
M/B Ratio 0.167*** 0.114*** 0.150*** 0.107*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D  2.274*** 1.847*** 2.030*** 1.627*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Advertising 3.111*** 3.473*** 3.211*** 3.443*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Adjusted R-square 0.165 0.184 0.173 0.192 
N 21,637 21,637 21,637 21,637 
The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on mutual fund ownership. The panel 
data is population-averaged before running the regression. Firm-level data are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI 
ESG KLD stats database. The dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number 
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product. All independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-4: Does Mutual Fund Ownership Influence CSR? - Evidence from Fixed 
Effects Regression 
Dependent Variable: CSR Scoret+1 
  1 2 3 4 
MF own -1.997*** 
   
 
(0.000) 
   
CSR F-own 
 
12.296*** 
 
11.032*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
CSR UF-own 
  
-4.218*** -3.724*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.424** 0.451*** 0.416** 0.454*** 
 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) 
Sales(Log) -0.057 -0.122** -0.085 -0.120* 
 
(0.360) (0.049) (0.169) (0.050) 
Book Leverage 0.013 0.085 0.013 0.055 
 
(0.945) (0.651) (0.946) (0.768) 
M/B Ratio 0.002 -0.021 -0.003 -0.015 
 
(0.923) (0.355) (0.891) (0.516) 
R&D  -1.117* -0.863 -1.080* -0.956 
 
(0.069) (0.146) (0.077) (0.105) 
Advertising -3.287 -3.331 -3.355 -3.310 
 
(0.116) (0.108) (0.103) (0.101) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.620 0.623 0.623 0.626 
N 18,224 18,224 18,224 18,224 
The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on lagged mutual fund ownership with 
firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-level data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI ESG KLD stats database. The 
dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number of strengths - #number of 
weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, 
and product. All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. All independent 
variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-5: Does Mutual Fund Ownership Influence CSR? - Evidence from Change 
Regressions 
Dependent Variable: ∆CSR Scoret+1 
 
CSR Score Below 
Median 
CSR Score Above 
Median 
Full 
Sample 
  1 2 3 
∆CSR F-own 3.498*** 3.133*** 2.805*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
∆CSR UF-own -1.417*** -1.688*** -0.725*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ROA 0.134 -0.230 -0.077 
 
(0.284) (0.196) (0.477) 
∆Sales(Log) 0.003 0.141** 0.062 
 
(0.957) (0.032) (0.181) 
∆Book Leverage -0.030 0.095 0.046 
 
(0.864) (0.595) (0.713) 
∆M/B Ratio 0.001 -0.055*** -0.038*** 
 
(0.956) (0.002) (0.004) 
∆R&D  -0.351 -0.665 -0.390 
 
(0.487) (0.213) (0.292) 
∆Advertising -0.446 -1.941 -0.721 
 
(0.665) (0.174) (0.434) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.044 0.039 
N 7,110 6,980 14,090 
The table reports results from regressing the change in CSR scores of a firm on lagged changes in mutual 
fund ownership. Column (1) and column (2) report the results for two subsamples: one where the firm’s 
CSR score in below median and one where the firm’s CSR score is above median. Column (3) reports the 
results for the whole sample. The dependent variable is the change in the CSR score of a firm from year t to 
year t+1. All independent variables are changes from year t to year t-1 and winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-6: Likelihood of Firms Offering CSR-Linked Compensation 
Dependent Variable: CSR Contract Dummyt+1 
  1 2 3 
MF own -2.052 
  
 
(0.105) 
  
CSR F-own 
 
2.411 2.195 
  
(0.217) (0.330) 
CSR UF-own 
 
-6.208* -9.683** 
  
(0.066) (0.013) 
CSR F-own X CSR Rating 
 
 
0.100 
  
 
(0.820) 
CSR UF-own X CSR Rating 
  
-2.052** 
   
(0.020) 
CSR Rating 0.034*** 0.029** 0.033 
 
(0.009) (0.023) (0.112) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo- R2 0.065 0.066 0.067 
N 1,298 1,298 1,298 
The table reports results from estimating different specifications of a logistic regression with CSR Contract 
Dummyt+1 as the dependent variable. The logistic CSR Contract dummy takes a value of 1 if the firm offers 
CSR contracts to its executives in a fiscal year, 0 otherwise. The firm control variables are the same as in 
Table 2-4. The last column employs a conditional logistic regression model. All independent variables are 
lagged by 1 year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2-7: CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses 
Dependent Variable: CSR Strengtht+1 CSR Weaknesst+1 
  1 2 3 4 
MF own -2.621*** 
 
-0.590** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.013) 
 CSR F-own 
 
9.446*** 
 
-1.798* 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.080) 
CSR UF-own 
 
-4.294*** 
 
-0.461 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.135) 
ROA -0.070 -0.050 -0.502*** -0.513*** 
 
(0.601) (0.702) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales(Log) 0.131*** 0.064 0.186*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.010) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000) 
Book Leverage -0.068 -0.027 -0.076 -0.077 
 
(0.682) (0.867) (0.550) (0.545) 
M/B Ratio 0.000 -0.018 -0.007 -0.008 
 
(0.997) (0.376) (0.642) (0.600) 
R&D  -0.974* -0.801 0.178 0.187 
 
(0.059) (0.110) (0.610) (0.588) 
Advertising -3.198* -3.255* -0.177 -0.211 
 
(0.074) (0.059) (0.853) (0.825) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.753 0.758 0.705 0.705 
N 18,224 18,224 18,224 18,224 
The table reports results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on lagged mutual fund ownership with 
firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the CSR strengths of a firm in the first two columns and is the 
CSR weakness of a firm in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm 
fixed effects. All independent variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 2-8: Alternative Explanations - Governance Variables 
Dependent Variable: ∆CSR Scoret+1 
 
Governance Executive Compensation 
  1 2 
∆CSR F-own 3.574*** 3.405*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
∆CSR UF-own -0.959*** -0.962*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
∆Board size 0.012 
 
 
(0.462) 
 ∆%independent directors 0.554*** 
 
 
(0.005) 
 ∆CEO delta 
 
0.001 
 
 
(0.202) 
∆CEO vega 
 
0.070 
 
 
(0.508) 
Firm Controls Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.026 
N 8,551 8,193 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2-1: Variable Descriptions for Chapter 2 
Variable Name Description 
Dependent Variables 
 CSR Rating CSR rating of the firm calculated from KLD data. It is 
defined as the #number of strengths - #number of weaknesses 
in the following categories: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product. For a 
more detailed description on how the strengths and 
weaknesses are calculated, please read the manual from 
Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD) database.  
  
CSR Strengths It is defined as the total number of strengths in the following 
categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product. 
  
CSR Weakness It is defined as the total number of weaknesses in the 
following categories: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product. 
  
Variables of Interest 
 Mutual Fund Ownership Mutual fund ownership is the percentage of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by the mutual funds. 
 
 CSR F-Own CSR F-Own is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares 
held by the CSR-friendly mutual funds. 
 
 
CSR UF-Own CSR UF-Own is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by the CSR-unfriendly mutual funds. 
  
Control Variables 
 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items divided by total book 
assets. 
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Size Log(sales). 
  
Leverage Book value of debt divided by market value of equity. 
  
M/B Market value of equity divided by book value of assets. 
  
R&D Research and Development spending divided by book value 
of assets. 
  
Advertising Advertising expense divided by book value of assets. 
  
Board Size Number of members on the board of directors. 
  
Board Independence Percentage of independent members on the board of directors. 
  
CEO delta Sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes in stock price. 
  
CEO vega Sensitivity of CEO’s wealth to changes in stock return 
volatility. 
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Appendix 2-2: CSR Keywords 
 Keywords to Identify Executive Compensation as CSR-Linked. 
 Community 
Compliance with ethical standards 
Corporate social responsibility 
Customer satisfaction 
Diversity 
Employee wellbeing 
Energy efficiency 
Environmental compliance 
Environmental goals 
Environmental performance 
Environmental projects 
Greenhouse gas emissions reductions 
Health 
Performance relative to a corporate social responsibility index  
e.g., Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
Product Safety 
Reduced injury rates 
Safety 
Sustainability 
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Appendix 2-3- Alternate measure of CSR F-own and CSR UF-own 
Dependent Variable:                         CSR Score t+1 
  1 2 3 4 
MF own -2.321*** 
   
 
(0.000) 
   
CSR F-own 
 
3.129*** 
 
2.737*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
CSR UF-own 
  
-5.120*** -4.977*** 
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.081 0.068 0.110 0.120 
 
(0.583) (0.643) (0.454) (0.412) 
Sales(Log) -0.046 -0.061 -0.039 -0.043 
 
(0.507) (0.377) (0.581) (0.537) 
Book Leverage 0.189 0.241 0.191 0.205 
 
(0.363) (0.244) (0.359) (0.323) 
M/B Ratio -0.046 -0.066** -0.047 -0.052* 
 
(0.137) (0.034) (0.127) (0.091) 
R&D  -0.658 -0.477 -0.643 -0.588 
 
(0.318) (0.463) (0.326) (0.364) 
Advertising -3.397 -3.267 -3.365 -3.313 
 
(0.126) (0.147) (0.130) (0.137) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.630 0.629 0.632 0.633 
N 19,162 19,162 19,162 19,162 
The table reports the results from regressing the CSR scores of a firm on alternate measures of lagged 
mutual fund ownership with firm fixed effects and year dummies. Firm-level data are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This sample is matched with the MSCI 
ESG KLD stats database. The dependent variable is the CSR score of a firm and is defined as the #number 
of strengths - #number of weaknesses in the six categories: community, diversity, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product. All regressions include both year fixed effects and firm fixed 
effects. All independent variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Are Credit Markets Tone Deaf? Evidence from Credit 
Default Swaps 
3.1 Introduction 
            Accounting information plays a very important role in the pricing of financial 
securities. In credit markets, researchers use a variety of accounting variables such as 
financial ratios, earnings, management forecast news and analyst reports to price credit 
securities such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS).11 However, most of these studies focus 
either on the quantitative information in accounting disclosures or on the events 
surrounding accounting disclosures. Surprisingly, little attention is given to the impact of 
qualitative or “soft” information, such as linguistic tone, in these accounting disclosures 
on CDS spreads. This is puzzling given that there is strong evidence to suggest that the 
tone of accounting disclosure contains incremental, value-relevant information beyond 
quantitative accounting measures; and internal and external stakeholders pay a lot of 
attention to the tone of accounting disclosures.12 
In this essay, we examine the role of linguistic tone of accounting disclosures in 
the pricing of CDS contracts. Specifically, we investigate whether 10-Q/K filings with 
higher proportions of uncertain words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible) 
                                                 
11
 See e.g., Altman, (1968); Ohlson, (1980); Duffie and Lando, (2001); Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009); 
Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, (2009); Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, (2011); Correia, Richardson, 
and Tuna, (2012); Griffin, (2014); Tang, Tian, and Yan, (2015); Batta, Qiu, and Yu, (2016); Bhat, Callen, 
and Segal, (2016), among others.  
12
 See e.g., Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat, and Segal, (2010); Henry, (2008); Li, (2008); Loughran and 
McDonald, (2011), and Jegadeesh and Wu, (2013), among others. Several studies show how disclosure 
tone influences stakeholder behaviour. For example, equity investors react to disclosure tone (e.g., Demers 
and Vega, 2011; Davis, Piger, and Sedor, 2012; Loughran and McDonald, 2013); shareholders react to 
“overly optimistic” disclosure tone by suing firms/managers (Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman, 2011); 
competitors change their real investment decisions based on the tone of the firms’ disclosure (Durnev and 
Mangen, 2011); analysts respond to change in disclosure tone (e.g., Allee and Deangelis, 2014); and lastly, 
managers who try to strategically “manage” the tone of their disclosure (e.g., Li, 2008; Huang, Teoh, and 
Zhang, 2014). 
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affect investors’ beliefs about the firm’s default risk as captured by CDS spreads. To 
measure disclosure tone, we use the uncertain word list from the dictionaries developed 
by Loughran and McDonald, (2011). We argue that the tone of 10-Q/K filings reflects the 
management’s confidence in the firm’s business strategy, competitive position within the 
industry, and future financial wellbeing. Any uncertainty expressed through the tone of 
these disclosures should influence investors’ evaluations of the firm’s future value. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that the higher the usage of uncertain words in these 
disclosures, the greater the uncertainty in investors’ beliefs about the firm’s value and 
thus, the higher the CDS spreads. 
            To test our hypothesis, we use daily CDS pricing data from WRDS-Markit over 
the period of 2001 to 2016 for the U.S. firms. The CDS market provides an ideal 
laboratory setting to test our hypothesis for the following reasons. First, CDS spreads 
provide a direct measure of the market price of a firm’s default risk, which clearly 
reflects what investors think about a firm’s likelihood of default. In comparison, 
corporate bond spreads are sensitive to the choice of benchmark, risk-free rates, and may 
capture other factors that are not related to default risk such as liquidity, taxes, and other 
frictions.13 Second, CDS markets are informationally more efficient at capturing default 
risk compared to bond markets. In fact, several studies show that CDS markets quickly 
incorporate information related to a firm’s default risk and lead bond markets in credit-
risk price discovery.14 Lastly, CDS contracts are standardized, highly liquid, and 
available at a daily frequency. They reflect cross-sectional and time-series credit quality 
information and allow academic researchers to perform clean and robust empirical tests. 
            We begin by examining the impact of uncertain tone on changes in CDS spreads. 
Specifically, we focus on the changes in CDS spreads during the 11-day (-5, +5) event 
                                                 
13
 For example, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann, (2001), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, (2005), and Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei, (2007) show that a large proportion of bonds spreads are determined by liquidity 
factors, which do not necessarily reflect the default risk of the issuing firm. 
14
 See Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, (2014). 
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window centered at the 10-Q/K filing date event.15 Changes in CDS spreads and the use 
of event study analyses provide direct evidence on whether uncertain disclosure tone 
contains relevant information about a firm’s future likelihood of default. We also 
understand that disclosure tone cannot be the sole determinant of a firm’s default risk, 
therefore, our analysis controls for several well-documented, firm-specific, as well as 
market factors, explain changes in CDS spreads such as stock return, credit ratings, and 
market volatility, among others. 
            We find a positive relation between uncertain disclosure tone and changes in CDS 
spreads. Firms with greater uncertainty in the tone of 10-Q/K disclosure experience a 
significant increase in their CDS spreads following the public disclosure. This effect is 
economically and statistically significant. We find that one standard deviation increase in 
uncertain tone increases the CDS spreads by 1.4 basis points (bps) relative to the mean 
change across all firms of around 0.47 bps. Our finding is robust to controlling for equity 
returns, market volatility, spot rate, aggregate default, and term premium. 
            We then investigate the impact of uncertain disclosure tone on the term structure 
of CDS spreads across maturities. Duffie and Lando, (2001) predict that firms with 
“noisy” accounting reports have significantly higher credit spreads at shorter maturities 
compared to longer maturities. Therefore, the effect of disclosure uncertainty varies 
across the term structure of credit spreads, with relatively higher impact for shorter 
maturities. Consistent with this prediction, we find that CDS spreads with short-term 
maturities have greater sensitivity to uncertain tone than long-term maturities. In fact, 
uncertain tone sensitivities decline monotonically with maturity. This finding suggests 
that disclosure tone contains useful default risk information for investors in valuation of 
CDS contracts, particularly with short-term maturity. 
            We rule out several alternative explanations for our results. First, we consider 
earnings surprise and firm-specific, “special” events including management guidance. 
                                                 
15
 Following Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009), we focus on the exact filing date of the financial statements 
to minimize the possibility that CDS spreads may incorporate other information.  
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Callen, Livnat, and Segal, (2009) argue that earnings convey information about default 
risk and show that changes in CDS spreads inversely relate to earnings surprises. As 10-
Q/K forms contain earnings information, it is plausible that the movement we observe in 
CDS spreads might be due to “new” earnings information and not due to the tone of the 
disclosure. To address this concern, we include earnings surprise in our baseline 
specification and find that uncertain tone contains incremental information about default 
risk that is not captured by earnings surprise. Besides earnings, public companies have to 
report certain material corporate events such as bankruptcy, financial misstatements, or 
other corporate major events in form 8-K. It is possible that such material events occur 
during our event window and convey additional default information, which results in 
changes in CDS spreads (e.g., Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011). To 
alleviate this possibility, we rerun our baseline specification by excluding event windows 
that coincide with special firm events reported in the form 8-K as well as management 
guidance. We find that excluding such events has no impact on our conclusions. Second, 
we consider readability of 10-Q/K filings. Li (2008), Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, (2011) 
and Loughran and McDonald, (2014) show that firms with less readable and more 
complex disclosures are associated with higher search costs and hence, greater riskiness. 
One might argue that the observed increase in the default risk of firms in our study might 
be due to the readability/complexity of such filings and not due to the tone of such 
disclosures. To test this explanation, we control for readability measures in our baseline 
regression and find that our results remain unchanged. Lastly, we consider alternative 
word lists. Loughran and McDonald, (2013) argue that negative and weak modal word 
lists might also capture the underlying ambiguity as the uncertain words. Similarly, the 
difference between negative and positive tone in the 10-Q/K filings can proxy 
uncertainty. To address these concerns, we re-estimate our baseline regression with these 
alternative proxies of uncertainty and find that the effect of uncertain tone on CDS 
spreads remains intact. 
            Our essay contributes to the literature in the following way. First, we highlight the 
importance of linguistic tone in the pricing of CDS contracts in credit markets alongside 
“quantitative” information from accounting disclosures. These findings add to the 
existing accounting literature that has mainly focused on the quantitative aspects of 
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accounting disclosures in the pricing of CDS contracts such as earnings, accrual, and cash 
flow information (e.g., Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009; Batta, Qiu, and Yu, 2016); 
management guidance (Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011); financial 
statement comparability (Kim, Kraft, and Ryan, 2013); and financial asset reliability 
(Arora, Richardson, and Tuna, 2014) among others.16 Second, our results add to the 
growing literature in accounting and finance that examines the impact of textual analysis 
on valuation of financial assets. Researchers have documented the usefulness of textual 
analysis in generating value-relevant information to investors. For example, studies have 
analyzed the tone, content, and sentiment in newspaper articles (e.g., Tetlock, 2007) 
corporate disclosures (e.g., Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) press releases (e.g., 
Engelberg, 2008) as well as investor message boards (e.g., Antweiler, Werner, and Frank, 
2004) and their impact on equity valuations. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
apply linguistic tone analysis to credit derivative pricing and show that disclosure tone of 
the accounting reports provides valuable information to investors in credit markets. 
            The rest of the essay is as follows. The next section discusses related research and 
outlines our main predictions. Section 3-3 describes the sample CDS and accounting tone 
data and highlights our research design. Section 3-4 reports the main empirical tests 
related to disclosure tone and CDS spreads. Section 3-5 considers several alternative 
explanations for our results. Section 3-6 presents robustness checks. Section 3-7 
concludes. 
3.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
            Several prior studies highlight the importance of accounting information in 
prediction of corporate defaults and valuation of credit market securities. For example, 
Altman, (1968) and Ohlson, (1980) use accounting information such as financial ratios to 
predict corporate bankruptcy. Duffie and Lando, (2001) show theoretically that noisy 
accounting reports create uncertainty about a firm’s future value in the investors’ minds, 
                                                 
16
 See Griffin, (2014) and Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, (2014) for a comprehensive review 
of accounting and finance research on CDS. 
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which affects the term structure of credit spreads. Researchers also use hybrid models of 
accounting- and market-based information in pricing financial distress through CDS 
contracts (e.g., Das, Hanouna, and Sarin, 2009; Correia, Richardson, and Tuna, 2012). 
Recent studies examine CDS spreads and their relationship with earning announcements 
(Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009); cash flow news in management forecasts (Shivakumar, 
Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011); the quality of internal control and cost of debt (Tang, 
Tian, and Yan, 2015); the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (Bhat, 
Callen, and Segal, 2016); risk factor disclosures in accounting reports (Chiu, Guan, and 
Kim, 2017) among others. 
            However, most of these studies use quantitative information in the accounting 
reports while giving little attention to the qualitative information in these reports. This is 
surprising because qualitative information, such as linguistic tone and writing style (or 
readability) of the accounting reports, conveys managers’ views about a firm’s future 
performance over and above the numbers in the financial statements. It also gives insight 
into the nature and magnitude of risks a firm faces in the future, which might have 
significant implications on the future firm value. Several studies exploit the usefulness of 
linguistic tone and/or readability of accounting disclosures in firm valuation.17 For 
example, studies show that stock returns react strongly to change in tone of a firm’s 10-
Q/K filings (Feldman, Govindraj, Livnat, and Segal, 2010; Li, 2010; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011; Jegadeesh and Wu, 2013) and readability of annual reports (Li, 2008). 
Studies also show that the tone of 10-Q/K disclosures also affects return volatility and 
analyst forecasts (Kothari, Li, and Short, 2009); future earnings (Davis and Tama-Sweet, 
2012); and competitors’ behaviour (Li, Lundholm, and Minnis, 2013). In fact, linguistic 
tone is so important to managers that they try to “strategically” manage the disclosure 
tone to obfuscate unfavourable information and mislead investors (Huang, Toeh and 
Zhang, 2014). 
                                                 
17
 Researchers also examine whether linguistic tone of press releases and conference calls affects a firm’s 
expected future value (e.g., Henry, 2008; Doran, Peterson, and Price, 2010; Price, Doran, Peterson, and 
Bliss, 2012; Huang, Teoh, and Zhang, 2014; Allee and Deangleis, 2015). For a comprehensive survey of 
literature, please refer to Kearney and Liu, (2014) and Loughran and McDonald, (2016).   
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            Now, if linguistic tone is informative to equity investors in assessing firm risk, 
then should it not be valuable to creditor market participants as well? The answer to this 
question depends on whether linguistic tone conveys relevant information regarding a 
firm’s future asset value. Traditional structural credit risk models, such as Merton, 
(1974), argue that if investors can perfectly observe a firm’s asset value and if a firm’s 
future asset value is stochastic, then accounting information (quantitative or qualitative) 
has no role in pricing of credit risk. However, in practice, investors in credit markets do 
not observe a firm’s assets perfectly. Because of this imperfect information environment, 
as Duffie and Lando, (2001) argue, investors infer a firm’s true financial condition from 
noisy accounting reports. Therefore, noisier accounting reports can lead to inaccurate 
assessments of a firm’s default probabilities that, in turn, increase credit spreads. 
            In our setting, we measure the noise in accounting reports by the use of uncertain 
words (e.g., approximate, uncertain, indefinite, possible) in 10-Q/K filings that intuitively 
capture the standard deviation of noise around the true firm value. Loughran and 
McDonald, (2013) find that firms with a higher proportion of uncertain words in their 
corporate disclosures face higher valuation uncertainty. We posit that firms that use a 
high frequency of uncertain words in their quarterly 10-Q/K filings create valuation 
uncertainty in investors’ minds, which results in higher credit spreads. Formally put, our 
first hypothesis is the following: 
H1:  Firms with higher uncertain disclosure tone have higher changes in CDS 
spreads around the disclosure event. 
            Furthermore, Duffie and Lando, (2001) also show that the shorter maturity credit 
spreads are significantly more sensitive to uncertainty in accounting reports than longer 
maturity credit spreads regardless of the riskiness of the firm. In other words, uncertainty 
affects the term structure of credit spreads. This arises when investors are more 
concerned about perceived default risk in the near future due to increased uncertainty 
than the perceived risk in the distant future. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
H2: The impact of uncertain disclosure tone is larger for relatively shorter 
maturity CDS contracts around the disclosure event, ceteris paribus. 
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            Lastly, Duffie and Lando, (2001) also suggest that the effect of uncertainty 
regarding the firm’s true value on credit spreads is larger for firms with lower initial asset 
value (i.e., firms with higher initial default probabilities). To proxy for a firm’s initial 
probability of default, we use a firm’s credit ratings. We divide firms into two groups 
based on credit ratings. Firms with a credit rating BBB and below are classified as 
speculative grade, while firms with a credit rating higher than BBB are classified as 
investment grade. We posit that the credit spreads of speculative grade firms (which are 
more likely to default) should be more sensitive to uncertainty compared to investment 
grade firms. Therefore, we expect the impact of uncertain disclosure tone to be larger for 
firms with a relatively poor credit rating. 
H3: The impact of uncertain disclosure tone is larger for firms with a relatively 
poor credit rating around the disclosure event. 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
            We test our hypotheses using the term structure of CDS spreads for U.S. firms. 
We obtain CDS data from Markit Group on WRDS over the period of 2001–2016. Markit 
is widely regarded as the leading provider of independent mark-to-market CDS data in 
the industry. It comprises of composite, end-of-day CDS spreads for firms with highly 
liquid contracts. We collect the daily data for all single name CDS contracts with one-, 
three-, five-, seven-, and 10-year maturity. To maintain uniformity in contracts, we only 
keep the CDS spreads for senior, unsecured debt with a modified restricting (MR) clause 
and denominated in US dollars. We primarily focus on the spreads of five-year CDS 
contracts, as they are the most liquid and have the best coverage in the database. We also 
use one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year CDS contracts to test our prediction related to the 
term structure of credit spreads. 
            The disclosure tone data are from the WRDS SEC analytics suite Readability and 
Sentiment Analysis database. The database reports the lexical features of the language 
used in accounting disclosures including financial report readability, linguistic 
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complexity, and uncertainty/weak modal words for each firm. We focus on the 
uncertainty word list (Fin-Unc) of Loughran and McDonald, (2011).18 This list includes 
285 words, such as approximate, uncertain, depends, unpredictable, and indefinite, that 
denote uncertainty through emphasis on imprecision rather than risk, particularly in 
business/financial context. To measure uncertain tone, we count the number of words that 
appear in the Loughran-McDonald Financial-Uncertainty words list and divide it by the 
total number of words in each firm’s 10-Q/K disclosure every quarter. Other readability 
measures such as Flesch-Kincaid index, Fog index, Coleman-Liau index, and Harvard 
general inquirer negative index are also from the WRDS SEC analytics suite. We match 
the daily CDS data with the disclosure tone data on the SEC filing date by linking 
permco, gvkey, and cik unique identifiers. Our initial match contains 809 firms and 
29,688 firm-quarter observations. 
            In addition to the CDS and tone data, we require the following firm-specific and 
economy-wide data to create control variables: Firm-specific control variables such as 
size, return of assets, and M/B ratio are from COMPUSTAT. We use gvkey to merge the 
COMPUSTAT data to the CDS and tone data. To calculate the event period equity return 
(EPER) and realized volatility (Rvol), we obtain data on equity prices, daily stock return, 
and the number of shares outstanding for each firm from CRSP. The firm-level credit 
rating data is the S&P long-term entity credit rating from COMPUSTAT. Economy-wide 
control variables include the following: Risk-free rate (Rf) is the three-month treasury-
bill yield, Term Spread (TS) is the difference between the yields of a 10-year and one-
year government bond, and the Default Spread (DS) is the difference between the yield of 
Moody’s Baa corporate bond and the yield of the 10-year constant maturity treasury 
bond. Data for all these variables are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We also control for aggregate 
investors’ risk appetites or market uncertainty by using a measure of implied volatility 
                                                 
18
 The complete word list is available at http://www.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html.  
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from S&P 500 index option prices with 30-day maturity, better known as VIX. The VIX 
data are from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) website. 
            Overall, after matching the control variables to the CDS data and disclosure tone 
data using gvkey and cusip identifiers, our final sample has 27,655 firm-quarter 
observations and 798 firms. 
3.3.1 Research Design 
            We use the short-window event study design to examine the impact of disclosure 
tone on the changes in CDS spreads. This design provides more direct evidence 
concerning the economic impact of the event on the dependent variable as the firm is its 
own control and mitigates heteroscedasticity concerns (Callen, Livnat, and Segal, 2009). 
Our baseline regression specification is the following: 
 ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸 +  𝛽2∆𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +   𝛽3∆𝑀/𝐵 
                          + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙 +  𝛽7∆𝑉𝐼𝑋 + 𝛽8∆𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽9∆𝑇𝑆 
                             + 𝛽10∆𝐷𝑆 + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀                                                                       (3.1)                               
where the dependent variable, ΔCDS Spread, is the change in CDS spreads over an 11-
day window [-5, +5] centered on the 10-Q/K disclosure date in excess of the median 
spread change for the CDS contracts with the same credit rating as the disclosing firm. 
Focusing on the spread changes in excess of the credit rating helps us immune our 
analysis to any systematic shocks within the credit rating category. The variable of 
interest in the regression is UNCTONE, which is the uncertain tone of the 10-Q/K 
disclosure. We measure UNCTONE by the percentage of uncertain words in each firm’s 
10-Q/K disclosure every quarter (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). 
            Following prior literature, we control for several firm-specific as well as 
economy-wide variables that are associated with changes in CDS spreads. Firm-specific 
controls include changes in firm size (ΔSize); return on assets (ΔROA); and market-to-
book (ΔM/B). The changes in these firm-specific controls are relative to the value in the 
previous quarter. We also control for cumulative daily equity returns (EPER) of the firm 
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during the [-5, +5] period and the realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity return over 
the event day [-252, -6] relative to the disclosure date. Using equity return and realized 
volatility help sharpen our interpretation of UNCTONE by isolating the “pure” credit 
risk-related information effect in the regression. We also include changes in market-wide 
variables during the [-5, +5] period as controls: risk-free rate (ΔRf); Implied Volatility of 
S&P 500 Index options (ΔVIX); Term Spread (ΔTS); and Default Spread (ΔDS). Our 
regression model includes an interaction of time and industry fixed effects. We cluster the 
standard errors at the firm level. The Appendix reports the definitions of all variables 
used in the baseline regression. 
3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
            Table 3-1 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The firms 
covered in our sample are large firms with a mean (median) market value of $20.7 ($7.7) 
billion. The firm size is highly skewed, with the average firm being three times as large 
as the median firm. Given the skewness of the size distribution, we use the natural 
logarithm of the firm size in all our empirical specifications and hence, log changes to 
measure changes in the firm size. 
            The other firm-specific controls in our specifications include measure of 
profitability captured using the return on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
event period equity return (EPER), and realized volatility (RVOL). The mean quarterly 
ROA in our sample is 1.02%. There is a large variation in ROA of firms in our sample 
with a 25th percentile value of 0.35% and a 75th percentile value of 1.95%. The mean 
(median) M/B ratio is 0.93 (.781). EPER, defined as the cumulative daily returns of the 
firm during the event period, has a mean (median) of 100.3 basis points (100.2). RVOL, 
defined as the annualized realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity returns over the 
past year has a mean (median) value of 0.345 (0.287). 
            The mean (median) CDS spread on the SEC filing day is 197 (87) basis points. 
Our main dependent variable is the change in CDS spreads around the disclosure event. 
The mean change in CDS spreads in our sample is around one basis point. Change in 
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CDS spreads varies significantly in our sample with the 25th and 75th percentile values of 
-3 and 3 basis points, respectively. 
            Our main independent variable of interest is disclosure uncertainty tone 
(UNCTONE). The mean value of the disclosure uncertainty tone is 1.38%. The 25th and 
75th percentile values for UNCTONE are 1.14% and 1.59%, respectively. The summary 
statistics for our UNCTONE suggest that it is not highly skewed and does not suffer from 
the presence of outliers. 
            The volatility index (VIX) of S&P 500 options has a mean (median) of 20.02 
(17.58). The mean (median) three-month risk-free rate (Rf) is 1.42 (0.31) per cent. Term 
spread (TS), defined as the 10-year U.S. treasury bond rate minus the risk-free rate, has a 
mean (median) of 2.05 (2.23) per cent. Default spread (DS), defined as Moody’s Baa 
Corporate bond rate relative to the 10-year treasury bond rate, has a mean (median) of 
2.67 (2.66) per cent. 
3.4  Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Main Result 
            We begin our analysis by testing our first hypothesis. We examine the 
relationship between the tone uncertainty and the change in five-year CDS spreads 
around the disclosure event date. To do so, we estimate the panel regression in equation 
(3.1). The dependent variable, ΔCDS Spread, is the change in CDS spreads over an 11-
day window [-5, +5] centered on the 10-Q/K disclosure date in excess of the median 
spread change for the CDS contracts with the same credit rating as the disclosing firm. 
            We present the results of the panel regression in Table 3-2. The change in firm-
specific variables are relative to the previous quarter. The market-level change variables 
reflect the change in market condition around the disclosure event date. In all our 
specifications, we include industry-quarter fixed effects and the clustered standard errors 
at the firm level. The specification in column (A) presents the results for the univariate 
regression. The coefficient on the measure of uncertain tone (UNCTONE) is positive and 
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statistically significant, which indicates that the CDS spreads of firms with uncertain 
disclosure tone increases around the disclosure event. 
            The specification in column (B) includes all firm level controls. The coefficient 
on the uncertain tone measure is greater in magnitude compared to column (A) and 
continues to be positive and significant. Examining the firm level controls, CDS spreads 
increase around the disclosure event date for firms that have recently experienced a 
decline in firm size. We also find that the CDS spreads increase for firms that have 
experienced an increase in market-to-book ratio. The coefficient on the event period 
cumulative return (EPER) indicates that firms with lower cumulative daily returns have a 
larger change in CDS spreads. These results are consistent with the intuition that lower 
equity returns, drop in firm equity, and market-to-book ratio increase default risk as 
reflected by an increase in CDS spreads. 
            The specification in column (C) includes all market level controls along with 
firm-specific controls. The market level controls do not affect the magnitude or 
significance of the uncertain tone measure but result in some improvement in the R2. The 
uncertain tone measure continues to be positive and statistically significant. The 
magnitude and significance of the firm controls also continue to be similar to the 
specification in column (B). Interestingly, we fail to detect any relationship between the 
change in VIX and the change in CDS spreads. However, the coefficient on the change in 
default spread is positive and significant, suggesting that firm CDS spreads increase with 
the increase in aggregate default risk. 
            Overall, the results in columns (A) to (C) confirm our first hypothesis that firms 
with relatively higher uncertain disclosure tone have a higher change in five-year CDS 
spreads. This result is also economically significant: the coefficient in column (2) 
indicates that an increase in uncertain disclosure tone from the 25th to 75th percentile (an 
increase of 0.45%) is associated with a 1.84 basis points higher change in CDS spreads 
around the event window. 
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3.4.2 Term Structure of CDS Spreads 
            Consistent with Duffie and Lando, (2001), our second hypothesis argues that the 
uncertainty in accounting reports about a firm’s assets affects the credit spreads of short-
term maturity contracts more than long-term maturity contracts. We examine this 
hypothesis using information from the term structure of CDS spreads. We use changes in 
one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year CDS spreads to estimate equation 3.1. We include both 
firm-specific and market controls for all maturities. The results of our analysis are in 
Table 3-3. Columns (2) to (5) present the regressions results for one-, three-, seven-, and 
10-year maturity contracts, respectively. The positive and significant coefficient on 
uncertain disclosure tone (UNCTONE) indicates that firms with higher uncertain tone 
have relatively higher change in spreads across all of these maturity contracts. More 
importantly, the coefficient on uncertain disclosure tone increases monotonically as the 
maturity decreases. The statistical significance of these coefficients is also higher at the 
short end of the term structure. Economically, as the uncertain tone measure moves from 
the 25th to 75th percentile, the change in spread for a one-year maturity contract is 3.2 
basis points versus 1.5 basis points for a 10-year maturity contract. This dramatic 
difference in the impact of the uncertain tone measure on the term structure of CDS 
spreads is consistent with the theoretical result in Duffie and Lando, (2001). 
            In the last column, we explicitly examine the statistical significance of the impact 
of tone uncertainty on the slope of the term structure of credit spreads. We estimate the 
relationship between tone uncertainty and the change in the slope of the term structure 
measured using the difference between 10-year and one-year credit spreads. The slope 
change is also measured in excess of the median slope change for the CDS contracts with 
the same credit rating as the disclosing firm. Consistent with the monotonic decline in the 
uncertainty coefficient with maturity, we find that the change in the slope negatively 
relates to the uncertainty tone. 
3.4.3  Effect of Issuer Ratings 
            Duffie and Lando, (2001) also show that the accounting precision of the firm’s 
assets affects the short-term credit spreads of riskier firms (firms with low asset value) 
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more than safer firms (firms with higher asset value). This implies that the impact of the 
uncertain disclosure tone on CDS spread changes should be larger for firms with a 
relatively worse initial credit rating. We test this hypothesis by splitting the sample 
between investment grade and speculative grade rating categories. 
            Table 3-4 examines the relationship between uncertain disclosure tone and CDS 
spreads across firms with investment grade and speculative grade credit rating separately. 
We identify investment grade firms as those that have a Standard & Poor (S&P) long-
term credit rating BBB- or better. Speculative grade firms are those that have an S&P 
long-term credit worse than BBB-. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3-4 present the results 
of the regression in equation 3.1 for investment grade firms. Columns (4) and (5) present 
the results for speculative grade firms. The coefficient on the uncertain disclosure tone is 
positive and significant for both investment grade and speculative grade firms. However, 
as expected by hypothesis 3, the positive coefficient is significantly larger in magnitude 
for speculative grade firms compared to investment grade firms. For speculative grade 
firms, an increase in the uncertain disclosure tone from the 25th to 75th percentile is 
associated with almost five times (4.98 bps) greater change in CDS spreads than for 
investment grade firms (1.18 bps). 
3.5 Alternative Explanations 
            We examine whether our findings are robust to other potential explanations 
around the disclosure event date. Specifically, we focus on the role of earnings surprise, 
management guidance, and other corporate events in the form of 8-K statements. Finally, 
we also examine the role of readability of financial statements in explaining our findings. 
3.5.1 Earnings Surprise, Management Guidance, and Other 
Special Firm-Specific Events 
            Firms with negative earnings surprise around the disclosure date are likely to have 
an increase in credit spreads due to perceived increase in default probabilities. In our 
regression analysis, we explicitly control for several determinants of the changes in 
default probabilities. The variables such as change in firm size, cumulative returns, 
change in market-to-book ratio, and realized volatility are likely to capture the effect of 
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earnings surprise and therefore, the associated changes in default probabilities. 
Nevertheless, we explicitly account for the effect of earnings surprise in our regression 
analysis. 
            We define earnings surprise as the difference between the actual earnings per 
share and the median analyst estimate standardized by the price of the stock. In column 
(1) of Table 3-5, we repeat our regression analysis with earnings surprise as an additional 
control along with all firm and market controls. The positive coefficient on uncertain 
disclosure continues to be statistically significant and similar in magnitude even after 
controlling for earnings surprise. The coefficient and significance of other firm and 
market controls are also largely unaffected. The earnings surprise coefficient is negative, 
suggesting that firms with a positive surprise have a decline in CDS spreads. However, 
the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
            Besides earnings, public companies must report certain material corporate events 
such as bankruptcy, financial misstatements, or other corporate major events in the 8-K 
statement. It is possible that such material events occur during our event window and 
convey additional default information, which results in changes in CDS spreads (e.g., 
Shivakumar, Urcan, Vasvari, and Zhang, 2011) To alleviate this possibility, we rerun our 
baseline specification by excluding event windows that coincide with special firm-
specific events reported in the 8-K as well as management guidance. 
             Column (2) of Table 3-5 reports the results of regression analysis by excluding 
firms that release 8-K statements around the event dates. The specification includes all 
firm and market controls. The positive coefficient on the uncertain disclosure tone is 
largely similar in magnitude and continues to be statistically significant. In column (3), 
we drop the firms that have management guidance around the event date. Once again, we 
obtain a positive coefficient on uncertain disclosure tone and the statistical significance is 
even higher in this case. In column (4), we drop both the firms with 8-K statements and 
management guidance around the event date. The results are robust to dropping these 
firms. 
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            In summary, our results immune to earnings surprise, firms issuing 8-K 
statements, or management guidance around the event dates. The positive effect of 
uncertain disclosure tone on CDS spreads changes continues to be statistically significant 
even after controlling for and dropping such events. 
3.5.2 Disclosure Readability and Complexity 
            In this section, we examine the implications of 10-Q/K filing readability for the 
uncertain tone and CDS spread relation. Several studies show that firms with less 
readable and more complex disclosures are associated with higher search costs and 
hence, greater riskiness (Li, 2008; Lehavy, Li, and Merkley, 2011). One might argue that 
the observed increase in the riskiness of firms in our study might be due to the 
readability/complexity of such filings and not due to the tone of such disclosures. To test 
the explanation that our measure of uncertain tone may be capturing the complexity of 
filings, we include various measures of readability/complexity as additional controls in 
our base regression. 
            Following Li, (2008) and Loughran and McDonald, (2014), we consider four 
measures of readability/complexity, which include the log of file size, Kincaid index, Fog 
index, and Coleman-Liau index. We refer the reader to Li, (2008) for additional details 
about these readability/complexity indices. We include each of these indices separately as 
an additional control together with all firm and market controls. Table 3-6 presents our 
results of our regression analysis including these additional controls. The main 
conclusion from Table 3-6 is that our results are unaffected by including these readability 
indices. The magnitude of the coefficient on uncertain tone measure is unchanged and it 
continues to be positive and significant. Moreover, none of the readability indices has a 
significant impact on the changes in CDS spreads around the disclosure event date. 
  
57 
 
 
3.5.3 Other Word Lists 
            We now turn to other linguistic tones expressed in the 10-Q/K filings. Loughran 
and McDonald, (2013) argue that negative and weak modal words might also capture the 
underlying ambiguity as the uncertain words. Similarly, another proxy of uncertainty can 
be the net negative tone, that is, the difference between negative and positive tone in the 
10-Q/K filings. Net negative tone captures managers’ net aggregate sentiments about the 
future value of the firm. If the net negative tone is positive, then it reflects managers’ 
pessimism about the future, which can lead to uncertainty around the true value of the 
firm and convey value-relevant information to credit markets. However, if both the 
alternate word lists and net negative tone capture the same source of ambiguity, then 
controlling for these variables in our baseline regression should make the coefficient of 
uncertain tone economically and statistically insignificant. 
            We test whether these alternative measures have incremental information beyond 
the uncertain tone in Table 3-7. We include alternative word lists such as negative, weak 
modal, and net negative tone (negative – positive) as control variables in our baseline 
regression. We find that negative tone is positively associated with changes in CDS 
spreads by itself; however, when we include the uncertain tone, the impact of negative 
tone weakens significantly. The economic magnitude drops by more than a quarter and 
statistical significance drops from five to 10 per cent. In addition, we do not see any 
significant association between a weak modal word list and net negative tone and 
changes in CDS spreads. Overall, the results in Table 3-7 suggest that uncertain tone 
captures distinct default risk information that other measures fail to capture. 
3.6 Robustness Checks 
            We conduct the following additional tests to check the robustness of our results. 
First, we test the sensitivity of the results in Table 3-2 to alternative event window 
specifications. We replicate our baseline regression with varying lengths of event window 
centered around the 10-Q/K disclosure filing date such as (i) three-day window ([-1, +1]); 
(ii) seven-day window ([-3, +3]); (iii) 21-day window ([-10, +10]); and (iv) six-day 
window ([0, +5]). Our conclusions remain unchanged after these modifications. Second, 
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we examine whether the inclusion of financial firms affects our results. Financial firms 
are very different from nonfinancial firms because financial firms are highly regulated 
and often act as the dealers and counterparties in CDS contracts. Therefore, we exclude 
financial firms from our analysis. Column (5) of Table 3-8 reports these results. We find 
that excluding financial firms from our sample has little impact on our inferences. Lastly, 
we test whether the inclusion of the financial crisis period of 2007–2009 alters our 
conclusions. Lok and Richardson, (2011) argue that credit markets reacted differently 
during the financial crisis when all firms moved closer to their default points. They state, 
“researchers need to be careful when using spread data from the financial crisis period, 
especially the latter part of 2008 and early 2009.” To make sure that our results are robust 
to financial crisis, we remove the crisis period from December 2007 to June 2009 from 
our sample data. Column (6) of Table 3-8 reports the results when we exclude the 
financial crisis period. The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant, 
which is very similar to column (3) of Table 3-2. 
3.7 Conclusions 
            Accounting disclosures are an important source of information for investors. 
Beyond disclosing the quantitative information, these disclosures also contain qualitative 
information that helps investors assess the value of the firm. An important piece of 
qualitative information is the linguistic tone of the disclosure. The tone of the accounting 
disclosure is important because it contains value-relevant information beyond the current 
quantitative measures. 
            In this essay, we examine whether credit markets react to the linguistic tone of 
accounting disclosures. In particular, we focus on the uncertain tone of 10-Q/K filings of 
firms. We find that credit markets react, measured by changes in CDS spreads, negatively 
to the uncertain tone expressed in the firms’ accounting disclosures. Consistent with the 
Duffie and Lando, (2001) model, we find that uncertainty expressed in the accounting 
disclosures affects the term structure of credit spreads. We find that CDS spreads with 
short-term maturities are more sensitive to the uncertain tone than long-term maturities. 
Taken together, these results underscore the importance of the linguistic tone of 
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accounting disclosures, which influences investors’ assessments about the firms’ future 
credit risks. 
            Our results have implications for managers as well as regulators. Because 
investors pay close attention to not only the quantitative information but also to how 
managers express their views in the disclosures, managers should be extremely careful in 
articulating firm-related information. The managers can significantly reduce valuation 
risks by simply choosing the right words. From a regulatory perspective, our results show 
the incremental valuation relevance of required qualitative information. Regulators can 
encourage firms to disclose more nonfinancial information that can improve the price 
discovery mechanism in the market. 
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Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Distribution of Variables (Levels) 
Variable Name Mean STD P25 Median P75 N 
CDS Spread (bps) 196.825 495.871 44.995 87.376 192.615 26,003 
UNCTONE (%) 1.378 0.349 1.139 1.358 1.587 26,002 
Size 8.973 1.412 8.042 8.959 9.863 25,377 
ROA 0.010 0.039 0.004 0.011 0.0195 26,003 
M/B 0.930 0.781 0.416 0.728 1.199 25,377 
EPER (bps) 100.314 12.573 97.132 100.169 103.162 24,978 
Rvol 0.345 0.221 0.209 0.287 0.403 24,984 
VIX 20.021 9.368 13.690 17.580 22.810 25,935 
Risk-free Rate (Rf) (bps) 142.338 171.769 9.000 31.000 247.000 26,001 
Term Spread (TS) (bps) 205.501 111.692 149.000 223.000 283.000 26,001 
Default Spread (DS) (bps) 267.464 85.154 205.000 266.000 306.000 26,001 
       Panel B: Distribution of Variables (Changes) 
Variable Name Mean STD P25 Median P75 N 
∆CDS Spread (bps) 0.466 109.866 -3.229 0.000 3.236 25,742 
∆Size 0.010 0.292 -0.070 0.026 0.113 24,632 
∆ROA 0.000 0.048 -0.005 0.000 0.005 25,297 
∆M/B 0.000 0.187 -0.056 0.006 0.070 24,632 
∆VIX 0.240 4.184 -1.870 -0.080 1.920 25,935 
∆Rf (bps) -2.023 16.288 -3.000 16.288 3.000 25,935 
∆TS (bps) -0.756 21.445 -13.000 -2.000 11.000 25,935 
∆DS (bps) 1.357 12.933 -5.000 2.000 8.000 25,935 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the important variables used in regressions. CDS Spread is 
the five-year CDS spread on the event day. Uncertainty is the proportion of uncertainty words to the total 
number of words in the document as measured by Loughran and McDonald (2011). Size is the logarithm of 
the market capitalization of the firm. ROA is the return on assets. M/B is the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of the total assets of the firm. Event-period equity return is the cumulative daily equity 
returns calculated over the event period. Rvol is the realized volatility of the firm’s daily equity returns 
over the past year. CR is the Standard & Poor credit rating of the firm. Risk-free Rate is the three-month 
U.S. Treasury bill rate. Term Spread is the difference between 10-year U.S. Treasury bond rate and the 
three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. Default Spread is the Moody’s corporate bond yield relative to the 
yield on 10-year Treasury bond rate. All the firm-specific change variables represent the change in value 
from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the 
event period. ∆CDS Spread is the change in five-year maturity CDS spreads over the event period relative 
to the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same period. 
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Table 3-2: The Effect of Uncertain Tone on the Change in CDS Spreads 
DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
  A 
 
B 
 
C 
UNCTONEi,t 3.336** 
 
3.864*** 
 
3.890*** 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
∆Sizei,t 
  
-46.232** 
 
-46.500** 
 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
∆M/Bi,t 
  
32.690*** 
 
33.117*** 
 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
∆ROAi,t 
  
4.289 
 
4.266 
 
  
(0.868) 
 
(0.869) 
EPERi,t 
  
-2.402*** 
 
-2.399*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rvoli,t 
  
-0.861 
 
-2.136 
 
  
(0.966) 
 
(0.915) 
∆VIX[-5,+5] 
    
-0.187 
 
    
(0.597) 
∆Rf[-5,+5] 
    
0.125 
 
    
(0.162) 
∆TS[-5,+5] 
    
0.076 
 
    
(0.369) 
∆DS[-5,+5] 
    
0.514*** 
 
    
(0.000) 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.009 
 
0.077 
 
0.081 
N 24,754 
 
24,009 
 
24,009 
This table reports the effect of uncertain tone in 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads around 
the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year 
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to 
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The 
independent variable of interest is the uncertainty word proportion as defined in the Appendix. The other 
independent variables consist of firm controls: change in size; change in return on assets (ROA); change in 
market-to-book ratio (M/B); event period return; and realized volatility (Rvol), and market controls: change 
in VIX; change in risk-free rate (Rf); change in term spread; change in default spread. All the firm-specific 
change variables represent the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, 
and ∆DS represent the change in value over the event period. The standard errors are clustered at firm level 
and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. 
Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3-3: Term Structure of CDS Spreads: Uncertain Tone and the Change in CDS 
Spreads 
DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
  1 Yr 
 
3 Yr 
 
7 Yr 
 
10 Yr 
 
10 Yr–1 Yr 
UNCTONEi,t 6.614*** 
 
5.196*** 
 
3.546** 
 
3.230** 
 
-3.281* 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.091) 
∆Sizei,t -61.711** 
 
-52.020*** 
 
-39.400** 
 
-38.232** 
 
24.770** 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.025) 
∆M/Bi,t 52.868*** 
 
36.981*** 
 
29.319*** 
 
28.024*** 
 
-25.946*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.000) 
∆ROAi,t -24.449 
 
-14.257 
 
-5.715 
 
-11.507 
 
12.651 
 
(0.555) 
 
(0.617) 
 
(0.802) 
 
(0.591) 
 
(0.638) 
EPERi,t -3.709*** 
 
-2.429*** 
 
-2.428*** 
 
-2.270*** 
 
1.373*** 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rvoli,t -14.816 
 
-12.032 
 
2.294 
 
8.969 
 
23.099 
 
(0.688) 
 
(0.616) 
 
(0.904) 
 
(0.614) 
 
(0.385) 
∆VIX[-5,+5] -0.736 
 
-0.056 
 
-0.073 
 
-0.005 
 
0.781** 
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.881) 
 
(0.832) 
 
(0.991) 
 
(0.018) 
∆Rf[-5,+5] 0.149 
 
0.143 
 
0.178* 
 
0.125 
 
-0.002 
 
(0.318) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.050) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.978) 
∆TS[-5,+5] 0.161 
 
0.098 
 
0.105 
 
0.067 
 
-0.082 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.333) 
 
(0.222) 
 
(0.435) 
 
(0.258) 
∆DS[-5,+5] 0.458* 
 
0.448*** 
 
0.530*** 
 
0.520*** 
 
0.066 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.696) 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.068 
 
0.071 
 
0.086 
 
0.085 
 
0.022 
N 21,902 
 
23,019 
 
22,889 
 
22,558 
 
21,292 
This table reports the effect of uncertainty tone in 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads 
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in CDS 
spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to the median 
change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period.  The other independent 
variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent the change in value 
from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the 
event period. All columns have firm and market controls. We present the results for various maturity 
contracts (one-, three-, seven-, and 10-year). 10 Yr–1 Yr represents the change in 10-year CDS spreads 
minus the change in one-year CDS spreads in excess of the median change in the same rating group. The 
standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The 
sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by 
***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3-4: Investment Grade and Speculative Grade Firms 
DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
  Investment Grade 
 
Speculative Grade 
UNCTONEi,t 2.601** 
 
2.629** 
 
11.103* 
 
11.076* 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.084) 
∆Sizei,t -33.281*** 
 
-33.391*** 
 
-57.399* 
 
-58.523* 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.070) 
∆M/Bi,t 16.244** 
 
16.347** 
 
62.773** 
 
63.700** 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.027) 
∆ROAi,t 2.631 
 
2.932 
 
-9.918 
 
-11.921 
 
(0.735) 
 
(0.707) 
 
(0.790) 
 
(0.750) 
EPERi,t -1.236*** 
 
-1.216*** 
 
-2.978*** 
 
-2.953*** 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Rvoli,t -25.080 
 
-25.515 
 
18.053 
 
14.472 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.693) 
 
(0.749) 
∆VIX[-5,+5] 
  
-0.023 
   
0.243 
 
  
(0.884) 
   
(0.827) 
∆Rf[-5,+5] 
  
0.021 
   
0.267 
 
  
(0.631) 
   
(0.448) 
∆TS[-5,+5] 
  
0.015 
   
0.183 
 
  
(0.669) 
   
(0.590) 
∆DS[-5,+5] 
  
0.177*** 
   
1.554*** 
 
  
(0.003) 
   
(0.001) 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.081 
 
0.082 
 
0.086 
 
0.091 
N 18,359 
 
18,359 
 
5,650 
 
5,650 
This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q and 10-K statements on the changes in CDS spreads 
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year 
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to 
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The 
independent variable of interest is the uncertainty word proportion as defined in the Appendix. The other 
independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent the 
change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change 
in value over the event period. We present the results for sub-samples based on credit ratings. The standard 
errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample 
period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
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Table 3-5: Earnings Surprise and Special Firm-Specific Events 
        DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
 
Earnings 
Surprise  
Excluding  
8-K 
Statements 
 
Excluding 
Management 
Guidance (MG) 
 
Excluding  
8-K and 
MG 
UNCTONEi,t 3.320** 
 
2.933** 
 
4.449*** 
 
3.312** 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.029) 
SUEi,t -17.083 
      
 
(0.565) 
      
All Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.093 
 
0.075 
 
0.080 
 
0.086 
N 22,896 
 
15,380 
 
21,011 
 
13,252 
This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads around 
the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year 
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to 
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The 
independent variable of interest is the uncertain tone as defined in the Appendix. Earnings Surprise is 
defined as the actual earnings minus the median analyst estimate standardized by price of the stock. The 
other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the firm-specific change variables represent 
the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, ∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the 
change in value over the event period. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are 
reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3-6: Report Readability, Uncertain Tone, and CDS Spreads 
DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
  Ln (File Size) 
 
Fog Index 
 
Flesch-Kincaid 
 
Coleman-Liau 
UNCTONEi,t 3.895*** 
 
3.929*** 
 
3.935*** 
 
3.837*** 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
Readabilityi,t -0.072 
 
0.225 
 
0.314 
 
0.207 
 
(0.903) 
 
(0.606) 
 
(0.495) 
 
(0.733) 
All Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.078 
 
0.079 
 
0.079 
 
0.079 
N 24,009 
 
24,009 
 
24,009 
 
24,009 
This table reports the effect of uncertainty tone on 10-Q/K statements on the changes in CDS spreads 
around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The dependent variable is the change in five-year 
maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to 
the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The 
independent variable of interest is uncertain tone defined in the Appendix. Readability measures include: 
log of 10-Q/K filings size (in megabytes), as defined by Loughran and McDonald (2014); Fog Index is 0.4* 
(average number of words per sentence + per cent of complex words); Flesch-Kincaid Index is 
0.39*(number of words/number of sentences) + 11.8*(number of syllables/number of words) – 15.59; 
Coleman- Liau Index is 0.0588*(average number of letters per 100 words) – 0.296*(average number of 
sentences per 100 words) – 15.8. The other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. All the 
firm-specific change variables represent the change in value from the previous quarter. ∆CDS Spread, 
∆VIX, ∆Rf, ∆TS, and ∆DS represent the change in value over the event period. The standard errors are 
clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. Industry X quarter 
fixed effects and credit rating fixed effects are included in all regressions. The sample period is from 2001 
to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 3-7: Other Word Lists and CDS Spreads 
DV: Change in CDS Spreadsi,[-5,+5] 
  A B C D E F G 
UNCTONEi,t 
   
3.413** 4.159** 3.504** 3.533** 
    
(0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) 
NEGTONE 1.879** 
 
 
1.489* 
 
  
 
(0.039) 
 
 
(0.085) 
 
  WEAK MODAL  
 
3.804 
  
-0.661 
  
  
(0.244) 
  
(0.869) 
 
 Net (NEG – POS) 
  
1.690* 
  
1.331 
 
 
  
(0.053) 
  
(0.110) 
 Harvard IV NEG 
      
62.867 
       
(0.332) 
All Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind X Qtr FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.081 0.078 0.081 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.079 
N 24,009 23,995 24,009 24,009 23,995 23,995 23,995 
This table reports the effect of other word lists on the uncertain tone and changes in CDS spreads around the event window [-5, +5] days of the disclosure. The 
dependent variable is the change in five-year maturity CDS spreads from a week before the disclosure to a week after the disclosure [-5, +5] relative to the 
median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The independent variable of interest is uncertain tone defined in the 
Appendix. Other word lists are from Loughran and McDonald (2011) and include: NEGTONE, defined as percentage of negative words in 10-Q/K filings; 
WEAK MODAL, defined as percentage of weak modal words in 10-Q/K filings. Net (NEG – POS) is the difference in percentage of negative and positive words 
in 10-Q/K filings. Harvard IV NEG is the list of negative words classified by Harvard Inquirer Dictionary. The other independent variables are the same as in 
Table 3-2. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. 
Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 3-8: Robustness Checks: Alternate Event Window and Other Specifications 
DV: Changes in CDS Spreads 
 
Alternate Window Specification 
 
Non-Financial  Non-Crisis 
 
[-1, +1]  [-3, +3]  [-10, +10]  [0, +5] 
    A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
 
F 
UNCTONEi,t 1.559* 
 
3.711** 
 
4.860*** 
 
3.371*** 
 
3.011** 
 
2.950** 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.032) 
All Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Ind x Qtr FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adj R2 0.020 
 
0.070 
 
0.098 
 
0.090 
 
0.077 
 
0.038 
N 24,110 
 
24,027 
 
23,900 
 
24,061 
 
19,907 
 
21,071 
This table reports the effect of uncertain tone on 10-Q/K on the changes in CDS spreads around the event window. The dependent variable is change in five-year 
maturity CDS spreads during the event window relative to the median change in CDS spreads in the same credit rating group across the same time period. The 
independent variable of interest is UNCTONEi,t defined in the Appendix. The other independent variables are the same as in Table 3-2. The standard errors are 
clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 2001 to 2016. Statistical significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3-1: Variable Descriptions for Chapter 3 
Variable Name Description 
CDS Change CDS spread at the end of the event window minus the CDS spread 
at the beginning of the event window (basis points). 
 
 Uncertainty The number of Loughran-McDonald Financial-Uncertainty words 
in the document divided by the total number of words in the 
document that occur in the master dictionary (percentage). 
 
 Size Logarithm of the market value of the firm. 
 
 ROA Net Income (NI) plus income from Extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (XIDO) divided by the dollar amount of 
assets in the firm (AT). 
 
 M/B Market Value of the Firm divided by the Book Value of the firm's 
assets. 
 
 Event period 
equity return 
(EPER) 
Cumulative daily returns of the firm during the event period 
obtained from CRSP. 
 
 Realized volatility 
(Rvol) 
Realized volatility (annualized) of the firm’s daily equity returns 
over the past year. 
 
 VIX Volatility Index is obtained from Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE). 
 
 Credit Rating 
(CR) 
Standard & Poor credit rating of a firm’s debt. CR takes values of 1 
to 22 with AAA being the lowest value and D being the highest 
value. 
 
 Risk-free rate (Rf) Three-month U.S. treasury bill rate.  
 
 Term Spread (TS) Ten-year U.S. treasury bond rate minus the three-month treasury 
bill rate. 
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Default Spread 
(DS) 
Moody’s Baa Corporate bond yield relative to yield on 10-year 
treasury bond rate. 
 
 Earnings Surprise Actual I/B/E/S earnings minus the median analysts’ forecast, scaled 
by price at quarter end. 
 
 
Fog Index 
0.4*(average number of words per sentence + per cent of complex 
words). 
  
Flesch-Kincaid 
0.39*(number of words/number of sentences) + 11.8*(number of 
syllables/number of words) – 15.59. 
  
Coleman-Liau 
0.0588*(average number of letters per 100 words) – 
0.296*(average number of sentences per 100 words) – 15.8. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Does Managerial Structure in Mutual Funds Affect 
Window Dressing? 
4.1 Introduction 
            Window dressing is an agency problem in the mutual fund industry where 
managers engage in portfolio manipulation by selling poorly performing stocks and 
buying stocks that performed well over the reporting period. As a result, they have a 
disproportionally higher percentage of well-performing stocks on the date of reporting. 
This practice is unfavourably looked upon by investors as it affects portfolio value 
through unnecessary trading costs and potentially priming the portfolio for lower future 
returns. This agency problem occurs because some managers have an incentive to hide 
their true managerial ability from investors. An important factor that affects the fund 
managers’ incentives to window dress is the type of organizational (managerial) structure 
at their fund. However, there has been little research on how organizational structure 
dissuades fund managers from engaging in unproductive and undesirable efforts. 
            In this essay, I look at whether the type of organizational structure at mutual funds 
affect the likelihood of window dressing. Specifically, I look at whether team-managed 
funds (mutual funds with two or more fund managers) window dress less than single-
managed funds (mutual funds with only one fund manager). Prior research shows that 
team-managed organizations can lower the inclination to engage in deceptive behaviour 
and that teams increase the cost of deception by greater peer monitoring (Arnott and 
Stiglitz, 1991; Mas and Moretti, 2009). Along with peer monitoring, individuals working 
in teams may also experience increased moral pressures such as guilt aversion (Charness 
and Dufwenberg, 2006). Teams also reduce the benefits of cheating by dividing the total 
output among several members, thus reducing each individual’s monetary incentives to 
cheat (Ma, Moore, and Turnbull, 1988; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Acemoglu, Kremer, 
and Mian, 2008). Additionally, some studies have found that fund managers are more 
likely to engage in window dressing behaviour when they have poor performance 
compared to the benchmark (Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, 2014; Meier and Schaumburg, 
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2004; He, Ng, and Wang, 2004; Ng and Wang, 2004). I add to this literature by 
investigating if team-managed funds reduce the level of window dressing compared to 
single-managed funds when they have poor performance. 
            I use data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Thomson Reuters, 
and Morningstar Direct, which cover actively-managed U.S. domestic equity mutual 
funds from 1998 to 2015. I consider the following styles of mutual funds: aggressive 
growth, growth, and growth and income. Following Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014), I 
measure the level of window dressing using backwards holdings return gap (BHRG), 
which is the difference between the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a 
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end of quarter holdings and the fund’s actual 
quarterly return. After accounting for several fund-specific variables, such as total net 
assets under management, two-month performance, trading costs, and fund family size, I 
find that, conditional on inferior performance, team-managed funds window dress less by 
almost 50% when compared to single-managed funds. I also test if this effect increases 
when the number of managers on a team is increased. Most of the differences between 
team-managed and single-managed funds come from teams of two managers and teams 
of 4+ managers. For example, two-manager teams window dress less by almost 20 basis 
points and teams with 4+ managers windows dress less by almost 30 basis points when 
compared to their single-managed counterparts. However, the difference between single-
managed funds and those funds with teams with three managers is not significantly 
different from zero in our sample and thus, I cannot conclude that window dressing 
decreases with increases in team size. 
            I next examine if the internal governance mechanism of a fund family has any 
impact on window dressing. Larger fund families tend to have more resources and better 
internal governance mechanisms. For example, in larger families, each fund has its own 
board of directors and an investment advisor, but in smaller fund families, a single board 
oversees the activities of all funds within the family (Khorana, 1996). This results in 
larger families monitoring their fund managers better and reducing the incentive of the 
fund manager to engage in window dressing. I find exactly this result, as team-managed 
funds do not differ from single-managed funds in the levels of window dressing among 
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large fund families. However, among smaller fund families where internal governance 
mechanisms are weaker, team-managed funds window dress less when compared to 
single-managed funds. 
            Finally, I examine if manager experience and age affect the window dressing 
incentives of a fund manager. Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) show that younger managers 
are more likely to get fired for poor performance compared to older managers and that 
career concerns and incentives differ vastly among more experienced, older managers vs 
younger managers. An experienced manager who has already achieved a high position in 
an industry is motivated to maintain that position. Thus, in periods of poor performance, 
older and more experienced managers are more likely to engage in window dressing and 
the results show exactly that. I find that team-managed funds window dress considerably 
less than their single-managed counterparts among more experienced managers, whereas, 
there is no difference between team-managed and single-managed funds among younger 
managers. 
            The essay makes two major contributions to the existing literature. First, this is 
the first essay in my knowledge to do a broad analysis on the effect of managerial 
structure on window dressing in mutual funds. I find that conditional on poor 
performance, team-managed funds window dress less than single-managed funds. This is 
possibly due to team-managed funds having greater peer monitoring along with reduced 
monetary and social incentives. These findings complement and extend the findings of 
Patel and Sarkissian, (2018) who find that managerial structure decreases “portfolio 
pumping,” which is another kind of deceptive practice.19 Second, I find that the impact of 
managerial structure is most effective when other governance mechanisms and incentive 
structures are not in place. 
                                                 
19
 Portfolio pumping is another deceptive mutual fund activity where the fund manager purchases already 
held stocks to drive up stock prices and thereby fund values (Carhart, Kaniel, Musto, and Reed, 2002; 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011; Hu, Mclean, Pontiff, and Wang, 2014). 
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            The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
related research and outlines our main predictions. Section 4.3 describes the data, sample 
selection, and variable construction. Section 4.4 reports the research design and main 
empirical tests related to how team-managed funds affect window dressing. Section 4.5 
considers two important alternative explanations for our results. Section 4.6 provides a 
conclusion. 
 
4.2 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Window Dressing in Mutual Funds 
            Investors evaluate a manager’s skill by comparing the fund’s past performance 
with a benchmark. However, this comparison may not suffice as stock returns are volatile 
and investors cannot know if a manager just got lucky or unlucky on some stock 
purchases. This results in investors also paying attention to the portfolio holdings as an 
additional signal to evaluate a manager’s skill (Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, 
1991; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zhang, (2005, 2008); Cohen, Coval, and Pastor, 2005; 
Jiang, Yao, and Yu, 2007). 
            Window dressing in mutual funds is a form of manipulation in which the money 
managers alter their portfolio before the disclosure date to hide their true ability. This is 
usually done by buying (selling) stocks that have done exceptionally well (poorly) over 
the reporting period and results in disproportionally higher holdings of “good” stocks on 
the date of disclosure. There exists ample empirical evidence of window dressing among 
mutual funds. Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny, (1991) show that, in the months 
leading up to the reporting date, pension funds sell more poorly performing “loser” 
stocks, slow down the pace of sale of well performing “winner” stocks, increase the 
purchases of winner stocks, and decrease the purchases of loser stocks. Musto, (1997) 
shows that money market funds hold disproportionately more government securities just 
before the disclosure date to give an impression that they are safer and more conservative 
than they really are. Chevalier and Ellison, (1997) find that funds alter the composition of 
their portfolios at the end of the year towards high-quality, less-risky stocks. Meier and 
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Schaumbaug, (2004) find evidence of high turnover of stocks in the last days of the 
quarter and find that poor performing funds are more likely to report misleading holdings. 
He, Ng and Wang, (2004) and Ng and Wang, (2004) show that institutions whose 
portfolios have underperformed the market tend to sell more poorly performing stocks in 
proportion to their holdings than those whose portfolios have outperformed the market in 
the final quarter of the year. Agarwal, Gay and Ling, (2014) provide a rationale for why 
managers window dress. Investors can observe the fund return at the end of each quarter, 
but funds have up to a 60-day window to report their holdings. Investors know of the 
holdings only after the delay period and the performance during the delay period can 
affect the investor’s interpretation of the two conflicting signals. If a poorly performing 
manager decides to window dress towards the end of the quarter, and if the fund performs 
well during the delay period, investors are less likely to attribute the signal conflict to 
window dressing and reward the fund with higher flows than otherwise. However, if the 
fund performs poorly during the delay period, then investors are more likely to attribute 
the signal conflict to window dressing and punish the fund with lower flows. Overall, 
window dressing behaviour is believed to be detrimental to investors’ returns as it affects 
fund value through two ways: unnecessary trading costs, and potentially buying (selling) 
overpriced (underpriced) stocks, priming the portfolio for future lower returns. 
4.2.2 Teams, Deception, and Window Dressing 
            The idea that groups and individuals act differently is divided into two groups: 
one that says decisions made by groups are inferior to that of individuals, and the other 
that argues decisions made by groups are superior to that of individuals. In economics, 
the negative effect of teams are associated with free-riding and indecisiveness, which 
result in loss of productivity (e.g., see Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmusen, 1987; Nalbantian 
and Schotter, 1997). Similarly in finance, some studies find no benefits of teamwork in 
enhancing the performance of professional money managers (e.g., Chen, Hong, Huang, 
and Kubik, 2004; Massa, Reuter, and Zitzewitz, 2010). However, there are many studies 
that show the positive effects of teams. For example, Sah and Stiglitz, (1986) and Sharpe, 
(1981) show that teams help diversify individuals’ opinions. Barry and Starks, (1984) 
provide a theoretical setting suggesting that teams in investment funds may reduce 
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portfolio risk. Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, (2003) find that teams increase 
productivity. Patel and Sarkissian, (2017) use equity mutual fund data and observe that 
team-managed funds outperform single-managed ones without resorting to extra risk 
taking. 
            As mentioned earlier, window dressing by mutual fund managers is a dishonest 
activity which negatively affects investor’s returns. In times of poor fund performance, 
engaging in window dressing activity is a way to hide managerial skill. A team 
environment can change the temptation to window dress as it increases social pressure 
and enables peer-monitoring. Employees can experience disutility if they find that their 
peers engage in deceptive behaviour as the productivity of an employee is also a function 
of the productivity of their co-workers (Mas and Moretti, 2009). Peer monitoring is also 
important in labour markets as workers are often in a better position to monitor their co-
workers than employers (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). Teams also provide different 
compensation structure and reduce the benefits of deception. Kandel and Lazear (1992) 
find that peer pressure and monitoring are more effective when all members of the 
organization share profits. Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2008) use a career concerns 
model and show that high powered incentives induce more productive effort from 
employees but also more unproductive efforts. They show that working in teams reduces 
the incentive to engage in unproductive and unethical behaviour. Patel and Sarkissian, 
(2018) show that team-managed funds engage less in portfolio pumping activity. Thus, I 
hypothesize that teams are less likely to window dress when they have poor performance. 
4.3 Data, Sample Selection, and Variable Construction 
4.3.1 Databases and Sample Selection 
            I use data from three sources: Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database; Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund database; and Morningstar Direct database. 
            The CRSP data provide information on mutual funds’ monthly returns, total net 
assets (TNA), inception date, fee structure, fund age, investment objectives, and other 
attributes. CRSP fund data are at the share class level (crsp_fundno), so I aggregate all 
fund characteristics at the individual fund level (wficn) based on their previous month’s 
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TNA to obtain value-weighted averages of monthly returns, annual expense ratios, and 
turnovers. The holdings of each mutual fund are obtained from Thomson Financial on a 
quarterly or semi-annual basis. The Thomson Financial database also includes the style of 
the fund (Investment Objective Code). As the focus of this essay is on equity mutual 
funds, I exclude international, municipal bonds, balanced, and bonds and preferred funds. 
The remaining equity styles are aggressive growth, growth, and growth and income. This 
dataset is merged with the CRSP database using a common identifier (wficn) MFLINKS 
database from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
            Data on mutual fund managerial structure are obtained from Morningstar. The 
Morningstar database contains the names of fund managers responsible for the 
management of the fund each year and the exact joining and leaving dates of fund 
managers. I determine the managerial structure of funds based on the total number of 
fund managers at the end of each quarter. If a fund is managed by only one fund manager 
at the end of the calendar year, I classify that fund as single-managed. If a fund is 
managed by two or more fund managers, I classify that fund as team-managed. Further, I 
divide team-managed funds into funds with two, three, four (or more) distinct fund 
managers at the end of the calendar year, denoted 2FM, 3FM, and 4+FM, respectively. 
This Morningstar database is then merged with the CRSP-Thomson database using the 
fund cusip.20 I remove all fund-quarters where fund manager names or tenure dates are 
missing and remove all funds that have a TNA of less than $10 million to remove the 
effect of very small funds. Our final sample covers unique funds with 2,525 unique funds 
and 69,045 fund-quarter observations from 1998–2015. 
4.3.2 Variables Construction 
Measure of Window Dressing 
            Backward Holdings Return Gap (BHRG) is the measure of window dressing. I 
follow Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014) to compute backward holdings return gap, which 
                                                 
20
 For unsuccessful merges, I match them using fund name and verify using fund TNA. 
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is the difference between the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a 
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end of quarter holdings and the fund’s actual 
quarterly return. The hypothetical portfolio is assumed to have been held throughout the 
quarter. The higher the BHRG measure, the greater the likelihood of window dressing. 
Other Variables 
            Alpha- The daily alphas are estimated based on the four-factor model from 
Carhart, (1997). The daily alphas are summed to compute the 2-month alpha. 
            Manager Skill is the 12-month moving average of the monthly return gap as 
calculated by Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008). The monthly return gap is the 
difference between the actual fund return in a quarter and the return of a hypothetical 
portfolio with last-reported holdings that are assumed to have been held throughout the 
quarter. Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) find that this measure is positively 
associated with the future returns of a mutual fund. 
            Trade Cost  is estimated using estimates from Keim and Madhavan, (1997), 
similar to Wermers, (2000), who provide fitted regressions for total institutional 
execution costs.21 
            Fund family TNA is the total net assets under the mutual fund family. I use the 
fund family identifier (mgmt_cd) to identify the mutual fund family and aggregate the 
TNA of all the funds under it. 
            The other variables I use in the analysis are: Style, which is a series of dummy 
variables constructed from the investment objective code (IOC) from Thomson Financial 
database; Fund TNA, which is the total net asset value of the fund; Fund Age, which is 
the difference between a fund’s inception year and the current year; Expense, which is the 
                                                 
21
 Refer to the Wermers, (2000) for more details. 
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mutual fund’s annual expense ratio; and Load dummy, which is an indicator variable set 
to 1 if a fund has a front-end or back-end load and 0 otherwise. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
        Table 4-1 (Panel A) shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations of all the 
important variables used in our analysis. The average fund TNA is around $1.3 billion, 
and the team-managed funds comprise around 65% of our observations. The mean value 
for backwards holdings return gap is 58 basis points and the median value is 21 basis 
points. Panel B of Table 4-1 shows the differences in fund characteristics between team-
managed and single-managed funds. When compared to single-managed funds, teams 
window dress less by nine basis points every quarter. Panel C shows the correlations 
between all the variables used in our analysis. Teams are negatively associated with 
BHRG. Although these correlations use contemporaneous values, they indicate that team-
managed funds window dress less than single-managed funds. 
4.4.2 Determinants of Window Dressing 
            I modify the regression specification used in Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014) to 
the following: 
𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                  (4.1) 
where 𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the window dressing measure (remember to elaborate BHRG 10% 
dummy) for fund 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 is the 2-month alpha of fund 𝑖, over the first two 
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months of the quarter 𝑡. 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. The other variables are the same as 
mentioned in section 4.3.2. All the right-hand side variables except alpha are measured at 
the beginning of the quarter (end of last quarter). I cluster standard errors at the fund 
level. Table 4-2 reports the results of the regression. As expected, window dressing is 
negatively related to the alpha and manager skill. The results are similar even in the 
second regression specification where 𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
BHRG measure belongs in the top 10th percentile in the quarter and 0 otherwise.  
4.4.3 Do Team-managed Funds Reduce Window Dressing? 
            Table 4-3 presents the results of the impact of teams on window dressing. The 
first two columns are very similar to Table 4-2 but with a 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 variable. The 
coefficient on 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is negative and significant only for the probit regression (first 
column). It shows that teams are less likely to be among the top window dressers. In the 
second column, which is a regular OLS, the coefficient on 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is not significant. 
But as observed by Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014); Meier and Schaumburg, (2004); He, 
Ng, and Wang, (2004); and Ng and Wang, (2004), the funds that perform poorly are the 
most likely to window dress to hide their true managerial ability. I find similar results in 
my sample where the BHRG measure is higher at lower levels of performance. To 
answer the question if teams reduce window dressing in mutual funds, I need to compare 
the difference in window dressing at lower levels of performance where funds are more 
likely to window dress. Figure 1 shows the difference in levels of window dressing 
among single-managed funds and team-managed funds at various levels of performance. 
The difference in the BHRG measure between single-managed and team-managed funds 
is considerably higher and significant at the lowest two deciles of performance. To test 
this in a multivariate setting, I estimate the following regression: 
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𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1, +  𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽11𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                  (4.2) 
where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a fund is team-managed and 0 
otherwise. BottomPerf is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the performance rank is in 
the last two deciles and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term 
that captures the effect of team-managed funds when fund performance is poor. The rest 
of the variables are the same as in equation 4.1. The hypothesis is that team-managed 
funds window dress less than single-managed funds, especially when the fund has poor 
performance. For this to be correct, β2+β3 < β3 or β2 should be negative. The third 
column of Table 4-3 presents the results of equation 4.2. The coefficient on the 
interaction term β2 is negative and statistically significant. This means that among poorly 
performing funds every quarter, team-managed funds window dress less by 20 basis 
points (almost 50%), when compared to single-managed funds. 
             I next look at whether team size has any impact on the level of window dressing. 
If the portfolio is divided into equal parts, then each manager gets to manage only a part 
of the incentive. Also, if the monitoring effect increases with team size, then I should 
observe lower levels of window dressing with increases in team size. Table 4-4 reports 
the results of the regression where column (1) compares the differences between single-
managed funds and teams with two managers. Column (2) compares the differences 
between single-managed funds and teams with three managers, and column (3) compares 
the differences between single-managed funds and teams with four+ managers. The 
coefficient on the interaction term β2 is negative, but significant only in the first and the 
third regression. Teams with two managers window dress less by 20 basis points 
compared to single-managed funds and teams of four+ managers window dress less by 30 
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basis points compared to single-managed funds. When comparing single-managed funds 
with teams of three managers, the coefficient is insignificant. Thus, I am unable to 
conclude that window dressing activity reduces with increases in team size. 
4.5 Alternative Explanations 
4.5.1 Internal Governance 
                        Ding and Wermers (2012) show that the mutual funds with better internal 
governance mechanism perform better. They also show that fund families with more 
independent directors are more likely to terminate underperforming inexperience 
managers. This internal governance mechanism is dependent on the board of 
directors/trustees, the investment advisor, and the underlying compensation contract. In 
larger fund families, each fund typically has its own board of directors and an investment 
advisor; but in smaller fund families, a single board oversees the activities of all funds 
within the family (Khoranna, 1996). Fund managers from smaller fund families are more 
likely to engage in window dressing behaviour than from larger fund families due to 
lower monitoring. Thus, I expect that there should not be any difference in the window 
dressing levels between team-managed funds and single-managed funds in fund families 
with stronger internal governance. On the other hand, I expect a significant difference 
between the window dressing levels of team-managed and single-managed funds among 
fund families with weaker internal governance. I use the fund family’s TNA as a proxy 
for the strength of internal governance, as larger fund families have more resources to 
monitor their fund managers. Table 4-5 presents the results of the regression where the 
sample is split into two: fund family TNA is below the median and fund family TNA is 
above the median. The results are in line with the prediction and the coefficient on 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is negative and significant for funds that belong to smaller 
fund families and the coefficient is insignificant for funds that belong to fund families. 
4.5.2 Manager Experience 
            Another explanation that can affect window dressing is the age of the manager. 
The theoretical models of  Scharfstein and Stein, (1990),  Zwiebel, (1995), and Avery and 
Chevalier, (1999) predict that, in particular environments, managers’ career concerns 
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may lead them to “herd” on a common action. Chevalier and Ellison, (1999) provide 
empirical evidence to show that a mutual fund manager’s behaviour is affected by career 
concerns. They find that even after controlling for performance, younger managers are 
more likely to be punished for deviating from the herd. They show that the risk incentives 
are very different for younger managers who have a whole career ahead of them than for 
older managers who have potentially already reached a high position in the industry. The 
older manager in a high position is motivated by the desire to maintain that position and 
thus, is more likely to window dress. Therefore, I expect that there should not be any 
difference in the window dressing levels between team-managed funds and single-
managed funds among younger managers with career concerns, and that there should be a 
significant difference between the window dressing levels of team-managed and single-
managed funds among older managers. I use the average industry tenure of the managers 
of the mutual fund to proxy for their experience in the industry. Table 4-6 reports the 
results of the regression where the Average Manager Industry Tenure is added as a 
control variable to the main specification. As expected, the variable is positive and 
significantly associated with window dressing. The second and third columns of Table 4-
6 report the results of the regression where the sample is split into two categories: 
average industry tenure is below the median and average industry tenure is above the 
median. The results are in line with the prediction and the coefficient on 
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑥 𝐵𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 is insignificant for funds that have younger managers but is 
negative and significant for funds with older fund managers with a reputation to protect.   
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4.6 Conclusions 
            In this essay, I use a sample of active domestic U.S. equity mutual funds from 
September 1998 to December 2015 to examine the impact of managerial structure on 
their window dressing behaviour.  The window dressing measure (BHRG) is measured at 
a quarterly level following Agarwal, Gay, and Ling, (2014). I find that team-managed 
mutual funds window dress less than single-managed funds when the performance of the 
fund is poor. The peer monitoring effect of teams is especially significant when the 
internal governance of the fund family is not strong. I also find that older, more 
experienced managers are more likely to engage in window dressing behaviour due to 
different career concerns. These results hold irrespective of the additional controls related 
to manager skill, fund size, turnover, and trade costs that can affect the propensity of a 
manager to window dress. Given that window dressing is detrimental to mutual fund 
value, these findings are significant and show that peer monitoring and the social benefits 
of team-based organizational structure are helpful in reducing deceptive activity in the 
mutual fund industry.  
90 
 
 
References for Chapter 4 
Acemoglu, D., Michael Kremer, and Atif Mian. (2008). Incentives in Markets, Firms, and 
Governments. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24(2), 273–306. 
Agarwal, V., Daniel, N. D., and Naik, N. Y. (2011). Do hedge funds manage their 
reported returns? Review of Financial Studies, 24, 3281–3320. 
Agarwal, V., Gay, G. D., and Ling, L. (2014). Window Dressing in Mutual Funds. 
Review of Financial Studies, 27(11), 3133–3170.  
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1991). Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: 
Dysfunctional Crowding Out of Peer Monitoring? The American Economic Review, 
81(1), 179–190. 
Avery, C. N. and Chevalier, J. A. (1999). Herding over the career. Economics Letters, 
63(3), 327–333.  
Barry, C. B. and Starks, L. T. (1984). Investment Management and Risk Sharing with 
Multiple Managers. The Journal of Finance, 39(2), 477. 
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(1), 57.  
Carhart, M. M., Kaniel, R., Musto, D. K., and Reed, A. V. (2002). Leaning for the tape: 
Evidence of gaming behavior in equity mutual funds. Journal of Finance, 58, 661–93. 
Charness, G. and Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and Partnership. Econometrica, 
74(6), 1579–1601. 
Chen, J., Harrison Hong, Ming Huang, and Jeffrey D. Kubik. (2004). Does Fund Size 
Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and Organization. The American 
Economic Review, 94(5), 1276–1302. 
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1997). Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to 
Incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 34. 
91 
 
 
Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G. (1999). Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 44. 
Cohen, R. B., Coval, J. D., & Pástor, Ľ. (2005). Judging fund managers by the company 
they keep. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1057-1096. 
Ding, B., & Wermers, R. (2012). Mutual fund performance and governance structure: 
The role of portfolio managers and boards of directors. 
Hamilton, B. H., Nickerson, J. A., & Owan, H. (2003). Team incentives and worker 
heterogeneity: An empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and 
participation. Journal of Political Economy, 111(3), 465-497. 
He, J., Ng, L., and Wang, Q. (2004). Quarterly Trading Patterns of Financial Institutions. 
The Journal of Business, 77(3), 493–509. 
Holmstrom, B. (1982). Moral Hazard in Teams. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), 
324.  
Hu, G., McLean, R. D., Pontiff, J., and Wang, Q. (2014). The year-end trading activities 
of institutional investors: Evidence from daily trades. Review of Financial Studies, 27, 
1593–1614. 
Jiang, G. J., Yao, T., & Yu, T. (2007). Do mutual funds time the market? Evidence from 
portfolio holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(3), 724-758 
Kandel, E. and Lazear, E. (1992). Peer Pressure and Partnerships. Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(4), 801–817. 
Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., and Zheng, L. (2005). On the industry concentration of 
actively managed equity mutual funds. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1983-2011. 
Kacperczyk, M., Sialm, C., and Zheng, L. (2008). Unobserved Actions of Mutual Funds. 
Review of Financial Studies, 21(6), 2379–2416.  
92 
 
 
Keim, D. B. and Madhavan, A. (1997). Transactions costs and investment style: an inter-
exchange analysis of institutional equity trades. Journal of Financial Economics, 46 
(1997) 265–292. 
Khorana, A. (1996). Top management turnover an empirical investigation of mutual fund 
managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(3), 403–427. 
Lakonishok, J., Andrei Shleifer, Richard Thaler, and Robert Vishny. (1991). Window 
Dressing by Pension Fund Managers. The American Economic Review, 81, 227–31. 
Ma, C. T., Moore, J., & Turnbull, S. (1988). Stopping agents from “cheating”. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 46(2), 355-372. 
Mas, A. and Moretti, E. (2009). Peers at work. The American Economic Review, 99(1), 
112–45.  
Massa, M., Reuter, J., and Zitzewitz, E. (2010). When should firms share credit with 
employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 95(3), 400–424.  
Meier, I. and Schaumburg, E. (2004). Do Funds Window Dress? Evidence for U.S. 
Domestic Equity Mutual Funds, Working Paper, HEC Montreal and Kellogg School of 
Management. 
Musto, D. K. (1997). Portfolio Disclosures and Year-End Price Shifts. The Journal of 
Finance, 52(4), 1563. 
Nalbantian Haig R. and Schotter A. (1997). Productivity under Group Incentives: An 
Experimental Study. The American Economic Review, 87(3), 314–341. 
Ng, L. and Wang, Q. (2004). Institutional trading and the turn-of-the-year effect. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 74(2), 343–366.  
Patel, S. and Sarkissian, S. (2017). To Group or Not to Group? Evidence from Mutual 
Fund Databases. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 52(05), 1989–2021.  
93 
 
 
Patel, S. and Sarkissian, S. (2018). Portfolio Pumping and Managerial Structure, 
(Working Paper). 
Rasmusen, E. (1987). Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 18(3), 428.  
Sah, Raaj Kumar and Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1986). The Architecture of Economic Systems: 
Hierarchies and Polyarchies. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 716–727. 
Scharfstein, David S. and Stein, Jeremy C. (1990). Herd Behavior and Investment. The 
American Economic Review, 80(3), 465–479. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1981). Decentralized Investment Management. The Journal of Finance, 
36(2), 217.  
Wermers, R. (2000). Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition into 
Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses. The Journal of Finance, 
55(4),1655–1695.  
Zwiebel, Jeffrey. (1995). Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation. Journal of 
Political Economy, 103(1), 1–25.  
94 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Window Dressing by Performance and Managerial Structure 
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Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics               
Variable   N Mean Median Min Max Std 
  
 
     
Team  69,045 0.6586 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4742 
BHRG  69,045 0.0058 0.0021 -0.0676 0.1230 0.0285 
Manager Skill  69,045 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0096 0.0098 0.0035 
2-month alpha  69,045 0.0033 0.0032 -0.0883 0.0918 0.0327 
TNA ($ million)  69,045 1,323.71 294.60 10.00 21,310.70 3,013.96 
Expense  69,045 0.0126 0.0121 0.0040 0.0252 0.0043 
Flow  69,045 0.0029 -0.0146 -0.2776 0.5906 0.1237 
Turnover  69,045 0.1042 0.0724 0.0000 0.5547 0.1077 
Trade Cost  69,045 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.0072 0.0013 
Fund Age  69,045 15.15 11.00 1.00 91.00 13.2817 
Fund Family TNA ($ million)   69,045 20,877.68 4,579.60 10.00 284,236.40 46,462.38 
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Panel B: Teams and Single-managed Funds             
  Team Single Difference  
(Team minus Single) 
P value 
Variable N Mean N Mean 
   
 
  
 
BHRG 45,473 0.0055 23,572 0.0064 -0.0009 <.001 
Manager Skill 45,473 -0.0001 23,572 0.0000 -0.0001 <.001 
2-month alpha 45,473 0.0031 23,572 0.0036 -0.0004 0.0480 
TNA ($ million) 45,473 1,291.04 23,572 1,386.73 -95.6900 <.001 
Flow 45,473 0.0023 23,572 0.0041 -0.0018 <.001 
Expense 45,473 0.0124 23,572 0.0128 -0.0003 <.001 
Turnover 45,473 0.1018 23,572 0.1088 -0.0070 <.001 
Trade Cost 45,473 0.0010 23,572 0.0011 -0.0001 <.001 
Fund Age 45,473 14.93 23,572 15.44 -0.5122 <.001 
Fund Family TNA ($ million) 45,473 14,435.09 23,572.00 33,516.27 -19,081.18 <.001 
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Panel C: Correlations 
  Team BHRG 
Manag
er Skill 
2-month 
alpha 
TNA 
Expen
se 
Flow Turnover 
Fund 
Age 
Family TNA 
BHRG -0.02 
         
Manager Skill -0.02 -0.01 
        
2-month alpha -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 
       
TNA -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 
      
Expense -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.28 
     
Flow -0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.13 -0.01 0.01 
    
Turnover -0.03 0.35 0.04 0.02 -0.13 0.12 0.01 
   
Trade Cost -0.04 0.21 0.08 -0.09 -0.17 0.22 -0.03 0.67 
  
Fund Age -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.38 -0.20 -0.10 -0.09 -0.17 
 
Fund Family TNA -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.41 -0.28 -0.01 -0.07 -0.15 0.23 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the important variables used in regressions. Team is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if more than one 
manager manages the mutual fund. BHRG is the Backward Holdings Return Gap calculated as the quarterly return (net of expenses and trade costs) of a 
hypothetical portfolio comprising a fund’s end-of-quarter holdings that are assumed to have been held throughout the quarter, and the fund’s actual quarterly 
return. Manager Skill is the 12-month moving average of the monthly return gap. 2-month alpha is the alpha estimated based on the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997). TNA is the total net asset value of the fund. Expense is the mutual fund’s annual expense ratio. Turnover is the minimum of the dollar values of 
purchases and sales in a quarter, divided by the total net assets at the beginning of the quarter. Fund Age is the age of the fund expressed in years. Fund Family 
TNA is the total net asset value of the mutual fund’s family. Panel A describes the summary statistics. Panel B shows the differences in characteristics between 
team-managed and single-managed funds. Panel C presents the correlations between all the variables. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 4-2: Determinants of Window Dressing 
  BHRG BHRG 10% 
Dummy 
  
2-month alphat -0.061*** -2.623*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Manager Skillt-1 -0.340*** -10.414** 
 
(0.002) (0.020) 
Expenset-1 0.085 19.097*** 
 
(0.295) (0.000) 
Log(TNA)t-1 -0.203 -26.001 
 
(0.354) (0.081) 
Trade Costt-1 -0.639*** 0.116 
 
(0.008) (0.989) 
Loadt-1 -0.000 -0.029 
 
(0.808) (0.532) 
Turnovert-1 0.077*** 3.461*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Log(FFTNA)t-1 0.178 1.803 
 
(0.346) (0.881) 
Fund Aget-1 0.049** 3.167** 
 
(0.029) (0.045) 
Time and Style Dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.110 
Number of Observations 64,161 64,161 
This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings 
Return Gap) on fund characteristics. BHRG 10% Dummy is an indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if 
BHRG is in the top 10th percentile for a given quarter. The independent variables consist of: 2-month alpha; 
Manager Skill; Expense; Log(TNA); Trade Cost; Load dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a fund 
charges a front load and 0 otherwise; Turnover; Log(FFTNA), which is the logarithm of Fund Family 
TNA; and Fund Age. The coefficients of Log(TNA), Log(FFTNA) and Fund Age have been multiplied by 
1,000. The standard errors are clustered at firm level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient 
estimates. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 4-3: Teams and Window Dressing 
  
BHRG 10% Dummy BHRG BHRG 
Team -0.077** -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.043) (0.700) (0.845) 
Team x Bottom Performance 
 
-0.002** 
   
(0.024) 
Bottom Performance 
  
0.004*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
2-month alphat -2.618*** -0.061*** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 Manager Skillt-1 -10.589** -0.341*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.017) (0.002) (0.003) 
Expenset-1 18.839*** 0.084 0.077 
 
(0.000) (0.301) (0.343) 
Log(TNA)t-1 -24.920* -0.200* -0.189* 
 
(0.093) (0.363) (0.386) 
Trade Costt-1 -0.364 -0.641*** -0.630*** 
 
(0.966) (0.008) (0.009) 
Loadt-1 -0.030 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.518) (0.808) (0.834) 
Turnovert-1 3.466*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(FFTNA)t-1 0.628 0.174 0.189 
 
(0.958) (0.361) (0.319) 
Fund Aget-1 2.966* 0.048* 0.048* 
 
(0.060) (0.031) (0.032) 
    Time and Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.116 0.115 
Number of Observations 64,161 64,161 64,161 
This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings 
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. BHRG 10% Dummy is an indicator variable, 
which is equal to 1 if BHRG is in the top 10th percentile for a given quarter. The main independent 
variables are team and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal 
to 1 if the fund belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The rest of the independent variables are 
the same as in Table 4-2. The standard errors are clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below 
the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
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Table 4-4: Team Size and Window Dressing 
  
Single vs 2 
Managers 
Single vs 3 
Managers 
Single vs 4+ 
Managers 
Team 0.001 -0.000 0.001* 
 
(0.425) (0.917) (0.065) 
Team x Bottom Performance -0.002** -0.001 -0.003*** 
 
(0.015) (0.424) (0.006) 
Bottom Performance 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Manager Skillt-1 -0.481*** -0.374** -0.377** 
 
(0.000) (0.017) (0.027) 
Expenset-1 0.066 0.043 -0.010 
 
(0.502) (0.687) (0.926) 
Log(TNA)t-1 -0.162 0.080 0.039 
 
(0.572) (0.800) (0.906) 
Trade Costt-1 -0.546* -0.442 -0.375 
 
(0.090) (0.212) (0.361) 
Loadt-1 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.764) (0.796) (0.584) 
Turnovert-1 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (Fund Family TNA) t-1 0.282 0.037 0.008 
 
(0.204) (0.883) (0.976) 
Fund Aget-1 0.059** 0.047** 0.054** 
 
(0.038) (0.138) (0.122) 
    Time and Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.118 0.119 
Number of Observations 40,999 32,059 27,287 
This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings 
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team 
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund 
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The rest of the independent variables are the same as in 
Table 4-2. The first column only contains observations of mutual funds with 1 manager and 2 managers. 
The second column only contains observations of mutual funds with 1 manager and 3 managers, and the 
final column only contains observations with 1 manager and 4+ managers. The standard errors are clustered 
at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is from 1999 
to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
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Table 4-5: Fund Family Governance and Window Dressing 
  
Fund Family TNA <Median Fund Family TNA>Median 
Team x Bottom Performance -0.002** -0.001 
 
(0.049) (0.469) 
Team -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.716) (0.845) 
Bottom Performance 0.005*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) 
Manager Skillt-1 -0.335*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Expenset-1 0.092 0.028 
 
(0.417) (0.787) 
Log(TNA)t-1 0.220 -0.101 
 
(0.499) (0.658) 
Trade Costt-1 -0.603* -0.859*** 
 
(0.059) (0.005) 
Loadt-1 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.385) (0.370) 
Turnovert-1 0.087*** 0.068*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Fund Age 0.012 0.057 
 
(0.732) (0.032) 
Time and Style Dummies Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.130 0.097 
Number of Observations 31,645 34,793 
This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings 
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team 
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund 
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4-2. 
The first column only contains observations where the Fund Family TNA is below the median Fund Family 
TNA. The second column only contains observations where the Fund Family TNA is above the median. 
The standard errors are clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. 
The sample period is from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated 
by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Table 4-6: Manager Industry Tenure and Window Dressing 
  
Full Sample Tenure < 5 years Tenure >= 5 years 
Team 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.686) (0.280) (0.502) 
Bottom Performance 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Team x Bottom Performance -0.002** -0.001 -0.002** 
 
(0.022) (0.268) (0.033) 
Manager Skillt-1 -0.360*** -0.469*** -0.177 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.230) 
Expenset-1 0.063 0.100 0.074 
 
(0.449) (0.364) (0.449) 
Log(TNA)t-1 -0.227 0.374 -0.619 
 
(0.299) (0.186) (0.025) 
Trade Costt-1 -0.677*** -0.799** -0.529** 
 
(0.006) (0.028) (0.032) 
Loadt-1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.996) (0.286) (0.579) 
Turnovert-1 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(FFTNA)t-1 0.206 -0.168 0.468 
 
(0.282) (0.534) (0.031) 
Fund Age 0.046** 0.040** 0.059** 
 
(0.039) (0.190) (0.026) 
Avg Manager Industry Tenuret-1 0.094* 
 
 
 
(0.074) 
 
 Time and Style Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.119 0.104 0.130 
Number of Observations 62,286 28,473 37,539 
This table reports the results of the regression on the window dressing measure BHRG (Backward Holdings 
Return Gap) on team-managed funds and fund characteristics. The main independent variables are team 
and the interaction of team with the bottom performance. Bottom Performance is equal to 1 if the fund 
belongs to the bottom quintile of 2-month alpha. The independent variables are the same as in Table 4-2 
with the addition of Average Manager Industry Tenure. The first column contains all the observations. The 
second column only contains observations where the average tenure is below the median. The second 
column only contains observations where the average tenure is above the median. The standard errors are 
clustered at fund level and the p-values are reported below the coefficient estimates. The sample period is 
from 1999 to 2015. Statistical significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% are indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
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Chapter 5 
            The thesis contributes to the finance literature in the following ways. Chapter 2 
contributes to the growing literature on the role of investors on the corporate social 
responsibility of a firm. I employ a novel measure of measuring CSR-friendly and CSR-
unfriendly ownership. Using a sample of all-equity U.S. mutual funds, I compute a CSR 
score for every mutual fund based on their holdings. Using this measure, I identify a 
mutual fund as CSR-friendly or CSR-unfriendly and then calculate the total amount of 
CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership in a firm in each year. The results also 
show that CSR-friendly and CSR-unfriendly ownership are important determinants of a 
firm’s CSR. Upon further investigation, the results reveal that CSR-friendly ownership is 
associated with future increases in CSR strengths and future decreases in CSR 
weaknesses. Likewise, CSR-unfriendly ownership is associated with future decreases in 
CSR strengths and has no effect on the future changes in the CSR weaknesses of a firm. 
The study also shows a direct channel through which CSR-friendly mutual funds can 
affect the CSR of a firm. Firms with higher CSR-friendly ownership are more likely to 
have executive compensation contracts linked to social performance. 
            Chapter 3 highlights the importance of linguistic tone in the pricing of CDS 
contracts in credit markets alongside “quantitative” information from accounting 
disclosures. We find that credit markets react, measured by changes in CDS spreads, 
negatively to the uncertain tone expressed in the firms’ accounting disclosures. 
Consistent with the Duffie and Lando (2001) model, the results show that uncertainty 
expressed in the accounting disclosures affects the term structure of credit spreads and 
that short-term maturities are more sensitive to the uncertain tone than long-term 
maturities. Taken together, these results underscore the importance of the linguistic tone 
of accounting disclosures, which influences investors’ assessments about the firms’ 
future credit risks. 
            These findings add to the existing accounting and finance literature that has 
mainly focused on the quantitative aspects of accounting disclosures in the pricing of 
CDS contracts such as earnings, accrual, and cash flow information. The results also add 
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to the growing literature that examines the impact of textual analysis on valuation of 
financial assets. Our results have implications for managers as well as regulators. As 
investors pay close attention to not only the quantitative information but also to how 
managers express their views in the disclosures, managers should be extremely careful in 
articulating firm-related information. The managers can significantly reduce valuation 
risks by simply choosing the right words. From a regulatory perspective, our results show 
the incremental valuation relevance of required qualitative information. Regulators can 
encourage firms to disclose more nonfinancial information that can improve the price 
discovery mechanism in the market. 
            In Chapter 4, I use a sample of active domestic U.S. equity mutual funds from 
September 1998 to December 2015 to examine the impact of managerial structure on the 
window dressing behaviour. Window Dressing is measured at a quarterly level by 
computing the backwards holdings return gap. I find that team-managed mutual funds 
window dress much less than single-managed funds when the performance of the fund is 
poor. I also investigate the circumstances under which team-managed funds have the 
most impact in reducing window dressing and find that older, more experienced 
managers are more likely to engage in window dressing behaviour due to different career 
concerns. I also find that team-managed funds reduce window dressing mostly when 
other monitoring mechanisms are weaker (smaller fund families). These results hold 
irrespective of the additional controls related to manager skill, fund size, turnover, and 
trade costs that can affect the propensity of a manager to window dress. Given that 
window dressing is value destroying, these findings are significant and show that peer 
monitoring and the social benefits of team-based organizational structure are helpful in 
reducing deceptive activity in the mutual fund industry when other monitoring 
mechanisms are not effective.  
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